排除型私的独占に係る独占禁止法上の指針 The Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act 排除型私的独占に係る独占禁止法上の指針 The Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act はじめに Introduction １　本指針の趣旨 1. Purpose of the Guidelines 「事業者が，単独に，又は他の事業者と結合し，若しくは通謀し，その他いかなる方法をもつてするかを問わず，他の事業者の事業活動を排除し，又は支配することにより，公共の利益に反して，一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限すること」は，私的独占の禁止及び公正取引の確保に関する法律（昭和２２年法律第５４号。以下「独占禁止法」という。）第２条第５項の規定において，私的独占であると定義されている。私的独占は，独占禁止法第３条の規定によって禁止されている。 Private monopolization, as defined in the provisions of Article 2 (5) of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (Act No.54 of 1947; hereinafter referred to as the "Antimonopoly Act"), is "such business activities, by which any entrepreneur, individually or by combination or conspiracy with other entrepreneurs, or by any other manner, excludes or controls the business activities of other entrepreneurs, thereby causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade." Private monopolization is prohibited under the provisions of Article 3 of the Antimonopoly Act. 私的独占に対しては，公正取引委員会は，独占禁止法第７条の規定に基づき，違反行為を排除するために必要な措置を命ずることができる。また，他の事業者の事業活動を支配することによる私的独占（以下「支配型私的独占」という。）について，公正取引委員会は，同法第７条の２第２項の規定に基づき，課徴金の納付を命じなければならない。 The Japan Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "JFTC") can take necessary measures against any private monopolization to eliminate the violation pursuant to the provisions of Article 7 of the Antimonopoly Act. In addition, the JFTC shall order payment of a surcharge pursuant to the provisions of Article 7-2 (2) of the Antimonopoly Act against any private monopolization by controlling the business activities of other entrepreneurs (hereinafter referred to as "Private Monopolization by Control"). 平成２１年６月に独占禁止法改正法（平成２１年法律第５１号）が成立したことにより，他の事業者の事業活動を排除することによる私的独占（以下「排除型私的独占」という。）について，公正取引委員会は，独占禁止法第７条の２第４項の規定に基づき，課徴金の納付を命じなければならないことになった（注１）。 Consequent to the establishment of Act No.51 of 2009 for amending the Antimonopoly Act in June 2009, the Act includes the provision that the JFTC shall order payment of a surcharge pursuant to Article 7-2 (4) of the Antimonopoly Act against any private monopolization by excluding the business activities of other entrepreneurs (hereinafter referred to as "Exclusionary Private Monopolization") (Note 1). 排除型私的独占とは，事業者が他の事業者の事業活動を排除する行為（以下「排除行為」という。）により，公共の利益に反して，一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限するものである。排除型私的独占に関しては，我が国においてこれまで法的措置をとった事例は必ずしも多くなく，問題となる行為の態様も多様かつ不定型である。また，あらゆる競争過程において，事業者の事業活動の結果として，他の事業者の商品（資金の貸付け，特許権等についての実施許諾，施設・設備機器の利用許諾その他の役務を含む。以下同じ。）が市場から淘汰されることは，当然に起こり得る。このため，排除型私的独占を課徴金の対象行為とすることについては，通常の事業活動の結果として他の事業者の事業活動を排除するに至った行為と排除行為とを区分することが容易ではないことから，事業者に対していわゆる萎縮効果を生じさせ，公正かつ自由な事業活動の支障となるのではないかとの指摘があった。 Exclusionary Private Monopolization refers to excluding the business activities of other entrepreneurs (hereinafter referred to as "Exclusionary Conduct"), thereby causing, contrary to public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade. There are not so many Exclusionary Private Monopolization cases in Japan, and various types of the alleged conduct fall under such monopolization. Moreover, it could naturally happen in every competition process that as a result of business activities of an entrepreneur, a product-in these guidelines, a product includes a service such as loan of funds and grant of a license concerning a patent right and grant of a license to use facilities and equipment - of the other entrepreneur is driven out of the market. Therefore, because of the difficulty in distinguishing Exclusionary Conduct from normal business activities leading to exclude the business activities of other entrepreneurs, it has been pointed out that the introduction of a surcharge against Exclusionary Private Monopolization might cause a so-called chilling effect for entrepreneurs and interfere with their fair and free business activities. これらの事情に照らし，公正取引委員会は，「排除型私的独占に係る独占禁止法上の指針」（以下「本指針」という。）を策定する。本指針は，排除型私的独占が成立するための要件に関する解釈を可能な限り明確化することにより，法運用の透明性を一層確保し，事業者の予見可能性をより向上させることを目的とする。 In light of these circumstances, the JFTC formulates the "Guidelines for the Exclusionary Private Monopolization under the Antimonopoly Act" (hereinafter referred to as the "Guidelines"). The purpose of the Guidelines is to ensure further transparency of law enforcement and to improve predictability for entrepreneurs by clarifying, to the extent possible, the requirements for Exclusionary Private Monopolization. ２　本指針の構成 2. Outline of the Guidelines 本指針では，公正取引委員会が排除型私的独占に係る事件として審査を行う際の方針を示すとともに，排除型私的独占が成立するための要件である「排除行為」及び「一定の取引分野における競争の実質的制限」の該当性についてそれぞれ記載する。事業者による排除行為が認められる場合であっても，一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限するといえない場合であれば，排除型私的独占は成立しない。 The Guidelines describe the JFTC's investigation policies about cases concerning Exclusionary Private Monopolization and what conduct may fall under "Exclusionary Conduct" and "substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of trade" as the requirements for Exclusionary Private Monopolization. If it would be deemed that an entrepreneur commits Exclusionary Conduct but not be deemed that the conduct substantially restrains competition in a particular field of trade, the conduct would not fall under Exclusionary Private Monopolization. 具体的には，まず，公正取引委員会が排除型私的独占に係る事件として優先的に審査を行うか否かの判断において，一般的に考慮する事項について記載する（後記第１）。次に，「排除行為」として問題となりやすい行為のうち主なものを類型化した上で，それぞれの行為類型ごとに，排除行為に該当するか否かを判断する際の検討の枠組みと判断要素について記載する（後記第２）。最後に，排除行為により一定の取引分野における競争が実質的に制限されたか否かを判断するため，一定の取引分野を画定するに当たっての考慮要素と，競争の実質的制限の存否を判断するに当たっての考慮要素について記載する（後記第３）。 Specifically, first, the Guidelines describe general matters that the JFTC is to consider when determining whether to prioritize investigation of a particular case as Exclusionary Private Monopolization (Part I below). The next part of the Guidelines shows types of chief conduct that tends to be deemed problematic as "Exclusionary Conduct" and the framework for deliberations and factors applied for assessing whether or not it falls under Exclusionary Conduct for each type (Part II below). Finally, the Guidelines describe the factors to be considered for defining a particular field of trade and determining the presence or absence of a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade when assessment is made over whether Exclusionary Conduct has substantially restrained competition in the field of trade (Part III below). なお，本指針は，現時点において想定される排除型私的独占についての独占禁止法上の考え方を明らかにするものである。今後，市場の状況の変化，技術革新等に伴い，市場における競争に悪影響を与える事業活動も変化していくことであろう。したがって，公正取引委員会は，今後の具体的な法運用及び市場の状況等を注視しつつ，必要に応じて本指針の見直しを行っていく。 The Guidelines clarify the JFTC's view under the Antimonopoly Act regarding the conceivable Exclusionary Private Monopolization in the present. Business activities undermining competition in the market will continue to change because of changes in market conditions, technological innovations, and other factors. Therefore, the JFTC will revise the Guidelines, as necessary, while reviewing the specific law enforcements and watching market conditions. （注１）排除型私的独占をした事業者に対しては，独占禁止法第７条の２第４項の規定に基づき，売上額の６パーセント（小売業の場合は２パーセント，卸売業の場合は１パーセント）に相当する額の課徴金の納付が命じられる。 (Note 1) Any entrepreneur who engages in Exclusionary Private Monopolization shall be ordered to pay a surcharge of an amount equivalent to 6% (2% in the case that the entrepreneur engages in retail business or 1% in the case that the entrepreneur engages in wholesale business) of the amount of sales, pursuant to the provisions of Article 7-2 (4) of the Antimonopoly Act. なお，他の事業者の事業活動を支配し，かつ，排除することによって，商品の対価に影響することとなる私的独占をした事業者に対しては，独占禁止法第７条の２第２項の規定に基づき，支配型私的独占に係る売上額の１０パーセント（小売業の場合は３パーセント，卸売業の場合は２パーセント）に相当する額の課徴金の納付が命じられる。 Any entrepreneur who engages in Private Monopolization affecting consideration of the product's price by controlling and excluding business activities of other entrepreneurs shall be ordered to pay a surcharge of an amount equivalent to 10% (3% in the case that the entrepreneur engages in retail business or 2% in the case that the entrepreneur engages in wholesale business) of the amount of sales concerning the Private Monopolization by Control, pursuant to the provisions of Article 7-2 (2) of the Antimonopoly Act. 第１　公正取引委員会の執行方針 Part I. Enforcement Policy of the JFTC 独占禁止法の目的は，市場における公正かつ自由な競争を促進し，事業者の創意を発揮させることにあり，その結果，一般消費者が良質・廉価な商品を幅広く選択することができるようにすることにある。 The purpose of the Antimonopoly Act is to promote fair and free competition in the market, stimulate the creative initiative of entrepreneurs, and thereby allow general consumers to choose from a wide variety of high-quality and low-cost products. 排除型私的独占に係るこれまでの事件のほとんどにおいて，排除行為の対象となった商品についてシェアが大きい事業者が審査の対象とされてきた。このように，他の事業者の事業活動を排除し，市場を閉鎖する効果を持つこととなるのは，行為者が供給する商品のシェア（注２）がある程度大きい場合がほとんどである。また，行為者が供給する商品のシェアが大きいほど，問題となる排除行為の実効性が高まりやすく，一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限することとなりやすいといえる。 In most of the past cases concerning Exclusionary Private Monopolization, entrepreneurs who were subject to the JFTC's investigation had a large share of the markets for the product related to Exclusionary Conduct. Thus, in most cases where an entrepreneur's conduct can be effective in excluding business activities of the other entrepreneurs and foreclosing the market, the share of the product (Note 2) that the said entrepreneur supplies is to some extent large. Moreover, the larger the share of the product that the said entrepreneur supplies is, the more likely it is that the alleged Exclusionary Conduct becomes highly effective in causing a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade. これらを踏まえ，公正取引委員会は，排除型私的独占として事件の審査を行うか否かの判断に当たり，行為開始後において行為者が供給する商品のシェアがおおむね２分の１を超える事案であって，市場規模，行為者による事業活動の範囲，商品の特性等を総合的に考慮すると，国民生活に与える影響が大きいと考えられるものについて，優先的に審査を行う。ただし，行為の態様，市場の状況，競争者の地位等によっては，これらの基準に合致しない事案であっても，排除型私的独占として事件の審査を行う場合がある。 In light of these, the JFTC, when deciding whether to investigate a case as Exclusionary Private Monopolization, will prioritize the case where the share of the product that the said entrepreneur supplies exceeds approximately 50% after the commencement of such conduct and where the conduct is deemed to have a serious impact on the lives of the citizenry, comprehensively considering the relevant factors such as market size, scope of business activities of the said entrepreneur, and characteristics of the product. However, even if a case does not meet these criteria, it may be subject to investigation of the case as Exclusionary Private Monopolization depending on the type of conduct, market conditions, positions of the competitors, and other factors. なお，問題となる事案について排除型私的独占に係る事件として審査した結果，それが排除型私的独占に該当すると認められない場合であっても，独占禁止法第２条第９項に規定する不公正な取引方法その他の独占禁止法の規定に違反する行為として問題になり得ることはいうまでもない。 Needless to say, even where the alleged conduct is found not to fall under Exclusionary Private Monopolization after the JFTC's investigation, it is still likely to be regulated as unfair trade practices, as provided for in Article 2 (9) of the Antimonopoly Act or as the conduct that violates the other provisions of the Antimonopoly Act. （注２）後記第２の４の「抱き合わせ」にあっては，主たる商品のシェアをいい，後記第２の５の「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」にあっては，川上市場における商品のシェアをいう。 (Note 2) "The share of the product" in the case of "Tying" (in 4 of Part II below) refers to the share of the tying product and "the share of the product" in the case of "Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment" (in 5 of Part II below) refers to the share of the product in the upstream market. また，複数の事業者が結合又は通謀して行為者となる場合のシェアは，各行為者の供給する商品のシェアを合算した値による。 If multiple entrepreneurs combined or conspired with each other, the share herein refers to the sum of the shares of products supplied by the respective entrepreneurs involved. 第２　排除行為 Part II. Exclusionary Conduct １　基本的考え方 1. Basic View （１）排除行為の性質 (1) Nature of Exclusionary Conduct 排除行為とは，他の事業者の事業活動の継続を困難にさせたり，新規参入者の事業開始を困難にさせたりする行為であって，一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限することにつながる様々な行為をいう。事業者が自らの効率性の向上等の企業努力により低価格で良質な商品を提供したことによって，競争者の非効率的な事業活動の継続が困難になったとしても，これは独占禁止法が目的とする公正かつ自由な競争の結果であり，このような行為が排除行為に該当することはない。 Exclusionary Conduct refers to various conducts that would cause difficulty for other entrepreneurs to continue their business activities or for new market entrants to commence their business activities, thereby would be likely to cause a substantial restraint of competition in a particular field of trade. In the case that an entrepreneur supplies a low-cost and high-quality product by its own efforts such as improving efficiency, and if such conduct would make it difficult for competitors to continue their inefficient business activities, it does not fall under Exclusionary Conduct because it is a result of fair and free competition, which the Antimonopoly Act intends to promote. 事業者の行為が排除行為に該当するためには，他の事業者の事業活動が市場から完全に駆逐されたり，新規参入が完全に阻止されたりする結果が現実に発生していることまでが必要とされるわけではない。すなわち，他の事業者の事業活動の継続を困難にさせたり，新規参入者の事業開始を困難にさせたりする蓋然性の高い行為は，排除行為に該当する。事業者が市場の状況等から事業経営上必要であると判断した行為であっても，そのことをもって排除行為に該当しなくなるわけではない。 To constitute Exclusionary Conduct, conduct of an entrepreneur does not have to result in the actual elimination of business activities of other entrepreneurs from the market or complete block of business activities of new market entrants. In other words, any conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct when it is highly likely to cause difficulties in continuing the business activities of other entrepreneurs or commencing the business activities of new market entrants. Even if such conduct was assessed by the entrepreneur to be indispensable for its business management because of the market conditions etc., it does not mean that the said conduct might not fall under Exclusionary Conduct. また，行為者が他の事業者の事業活動を排除する意図を有していることは，排除行為に該当するための不可欠の要件ではない。しかし，主観的要素としての排除する意図は，問題となる行為が排除行為であることを推認させる重要な事実となり得る。さらに，排除する意図の下に複数の行為が行われたときには，これらの行為をまとめて，排除する意図を実現するための一連の，かつ，一体的な行為であると認定し得る場合がある。 It is not essential that for falling under Exclusionary Conduct, the entrepreneur had the exclusionary intent. However, the exclusionary intent as a subjective element can be an important fact leading the presumption that the alleged conduct is Exclusionary Conduct. Moreover, when the entrepreneur has engaged in multiple acts with the exclusionary intent, these acts may be collectively recognized as a series of integrated acts aimed at realizing the exclusionary intent. なお，「他の事業者の事業活動を排除する」行為には，行為者が当該他の事業者に対して直接行うものだけでなく，行為者がその取引先を通じて間接的に行うものも含まれる。さらに，複数の事業者が結合し，通謀するなどによって行うものも含まれる。 In addition, "excluding business activities of other entrepreneurs" include not only direct but also indirect conduct via its trading partner against the said other entrepreneurs. Moreover, such conduct also includes the conduct committed by multiple entrepreneurs in combination or in conspiracy with each other. （２）排除行為の類型 (2) Types of Exclusionary Conduct 排除行為の典型としては，まず，独占禁止法第２条第９項各号に掲げる不公正な取引方法と同様の行為類型がある。したがって，不公正な取引方法のうち一部の行為については，排除行為に該当することがある。他方，これまでの排除型私的独占の事例においては，排除行為は必ずしも不公正な取引方法と同様の行為に限られず，そのような行為以外の行為類型も排除行為とされている。 The first example of typical Exclusionary Conduct is a type of conduct similar to the unfair trade practices listed in Article 2 (9) of the Antimonopoly Act. Therefore, a part of unfair trade practices may fall under Exclusionary Conduct. On the other hand, in past cases of Exclusionary Private Monopolization, Exclusionary Conduct has not necessarily been limited to those similar to unfair trade practices, and types of conduct other than these have been also regarded as Exclusionary Conduct. このように，排除行為に該当し得る行為は多種多様であることから，これらのすべてを類型化することは困難である。しかし，排除行為に該当するか否かを判断する際に考慮すべき要素は行為類型によって異なることから，可能な限り排除行為を類型化して，行為類型ごとに判断要素を掲げることが，法運用の透明性の確保及び事業者の予見可能性の向上の観点から有益であると考えられる。 Thus, there is a wide variety of conduct deemed as Exclusionary Conduct, so it is difficult to characterize all of them. However, factors to be considered for assessing whether the alleged conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct differ according to the type of the conduct. Therefore, to the extent possible, breaking down Exclusionary Conduct into types and listing factors for assessment for each type of conduct are beneficial from the viewpoint of ensuring transparency of law enforcement and improving predictability of entrepreneurs. このため，本指針においては，これまでの事件において問題となった行為を中心に，排除行為として典型的な行為を「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用を下回る対価設定」，「排他的取引」，「抱き合わせ」及び「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」の４つに類型化し，それぞれの行為類型ごとに排除行為の該当性についての判断要素を記載する。もちろん，排除型私的独占を構成する排除行為はこれら４つの類型に当てはまるものに限られない。例えば，競争者と競合する販売地域又は顧客に限定して行う価格設定行為（注３）や，他の事業者の事業活動を妨害する行為（注４）を排除行為と評価することがある。また，複数の行為をまとめて，一連の，かつ，一体的な排除行為と評価することもある（注５）。 The Guidelines describe four typical Exclusionary Conducts-"Below-cost Pricing," "Exclusive Dealing," "Tying," and "Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment" in reference to past cases-and for each type of conduct, consideration factors for assessing whether the alleged conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct. Of course, Exclusionary Conduct that constitutes Exclusionary Private Monopolization is not limited to the acts that fall under these four typical Exclusionary Conducts. For example, setting a price exclusively either in the sales territory where an entrepreneur competes with others or for customers, for whom an entrepreneur competes with others (Note 3), or interfering with business activities of other entrepreneurs (Note 4) may be regarded as Exclusionary Conduct in some cases. Further, multiple acts may be collectively regarded as a series of integrated Exclusionary Conduct (Note 5). なお，後記２から５までに示した具体例は，排除行為の該当性について具体的に理解することを助けるために，過去の審判決において排除型私的独占として問題となった行為を例として掲げるものである。また，参考例は，同じく排除行為の該当性について具体的に理解することを助けるために，過去の審判決等において不公正な取引方法として問題となった行為を例として掲げるものである。本指針に取り上げられていない行為を含め，具体的な行為が排除行為に該当するか否かはすべて，独占禁止法の規定に照らして，個別の事案ごとに判断されるものであることはいうまでもない（注６）（注７）。 The illustrative examples given in 2 to 5 of Part II below show conducts deemed as Exclusionary Private Monopolizations in past decisions and judgments for the purpose of helping in understand concretely what conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct. The reference examples are also given to help understand concretely what conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct by showing conduct deemed as unfair trade practices in past decisions, judgments, and others. Needless to say, assessment over whether specific conduct, including conduct not referred to in the Guidelines, falls under Exclusionary Conduct is to be made in the context of individual cases pursuant to the provisions of the Antimonopoly Act (Notes 6 and 7). （注３）競争者と競合する販売地域又は顧客に限定して行う価格設定行為の具体例としては，競争者であるＹ社から短期間で大量の顧客を奪い，その音楽放送事業運営を困難にすることを企図して，Ｙ社の商品と顧客層が重複する商品について，Ｙ社の顧客のみを対象に，月額聴取料の無料期間を長期間としたり，最低月額聴取料を大幅に引き下げたりするなどのキャンペーンを実施する行為がＹ社の音楽放送事業に係る事業活動を排除するものであると認定された事例（平成１６年１０月１３日勧告審決，平成１６年（勧）第２６号）がある。 (Note 3) The following is an illustrative example of setting a price exclusively either in sales territory where an entrepreneur competes with others or for customers, for whom an entrepreneur competes with others: Company X, a music broadcasting business entrepreneur in Japan, in an attempt to deprive a competitor, Company Y, of a large number of its customers in a short period and to make it difficult for Company Y to manage its music broadcasting business, carried out campaigns only for Company Y's customers, which significantly prolonged free subscription period and significantly lowered minimum subscription fee for the products that competed with Company Y's products. Such conduct was found to exclude the business activities of the said competitor in the music broadcasting business (JFTC recommendation decision, October 13, 2004). （注４）他の事業者の事業活動を妨害する行為の具体例としては，次のようなものがある。 (Note 4) The following are illustrative examples of conducts of interfering with business activities of other entrepreneurs: ①我が国における総供給量の約５６パーセントのシェアを有する食缶製造業者であるＸ社（Ｘ社が事業活動を支配していたＡ社，Ｂ社，Ｃ社及びＤ社のシェアをＸ社のシェアに加えると７４パーセントとなる。）が，缶詰製造原価の引下げを目的として自家消費用の食缶の製造（自家製缶）を企図する缶詰製造業者Ｙ社に対し，これを断念させるため，Ｙ社が自家製缶できない食缶の供給を停止する行為が缶詰製造業者の自家製缶についての事業活動を排除するものであると認定された事例（昭和４７年９月１８日勧告審決，昭和４７年（勧）第１１号） 1) Company X-a food cans manufacturer-which held approximately 56% (Company X and Companies A, B, C, and D, whose business activities were dominated by Company X, collectively held approximately 74 %) of the market share of all such products supplied in Japan-discontinued its supply of food cans that the canned food manufacturer Company Y could not manufacture on its own, with the intent to make Company Y give up its attempt to independently manufacture food cans to reduce the cost of manufacturing its canned food. Such conduct was found to exclude the business activities of food can manufacturers' producing food cans on their own (JFTC recommendation decision, September 18, 1972). ②医療用食品の検定機関であるＸ財団が，医療用食品を販売するＹ社から，医療機関向け医療用食品の販売を一手に行いたい旨の要請を受け，医療用食品の製造業者間及び販売業者間の競争を生じさせないようにするため，医療用食品の登録品目等を限定するとともに，医療用食品の製造工場認定制度及び販売業者認定制度に基づき，販売地域，販売先等の制限を行う行為が医療用食品を製造又は販売しようとする事業者の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された事例（平成８年５月８日勧告審決，平成８年（勧）第１４号） 2) Foundation X-a medical food examination institution-restricted registered items etc. of medical food and restricted sales territories and sales destinations of medical food etc. on the basis of the manufacturing plant recognition system and distributor recognition system for medical food, upon the request of medical food distributor Company Y to become the sole distributor of medical food for medical institutions, with the intent to prevent competition among medical food manufacturers and among medical food distributors. Such conduct was found to exclude the business activities of the entrepreneurs that intended to produce or distribute medical food (JFTC recommendation decision, May 8, 1996). （注５）複数の行為をまとめて，一連の，かつ，一体的な排除行為と評価された具体例としては，函館地区で発行される一般日刊新聞朝刊及び夕刊においてそれぞれの総発行部数の大部分を占めるＸ社が，Ｙ社の同地区への参入を妨害し，その新聞発行事業の継続を困難にさせるための具体的な対策を決定し，これに基づき行った①Ｙ社が使用すると目される複数の新聞題字の商標登録の出願，②Ｙ社からのニュース配信要請に応じないよう求めたこと，③Ｙ社の広告集稿対象事業者への大幅な割引広告料金等の設定，④Ｙ社のテレビコマーシャル放映の申込みに応じないことの要請からなる函館対策と称する一連の行為がＹ社の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された事例（平成１２年２月２８日同意審決，平成１０年（判）第２号）等がある。 (Note 5) The following is an illustrative example for multiple acts that are collectively regarded as a series of integrated Exclusionary Conduct: Company X, which published a large percentage of a daily morning and evening newspaper in the Hakodate area, decided to take up measures to make it difficult for Company Y to continue its daily evening newspaper publishing business and to interfere with Company Y entering into the area. On the basis of the decision, a series of the multiple acts that consisted of a) applying for trademark registrations of newspaper mastheads that were expected to be used by Company Y, b) requiring a news agency to refuse Y's offer for providing news service from Company Y, c) setting significantly discounted advertising rates to entrepreneurs that Company Y looked at as advertisers, and d) requesting a TV station to refuse Company Y's offer to broadcast TV commercials as the countermeasures against Company Y was found to exclude the business activities of Company Y (JFTC consent decision, February 28, 2000). （注６）技術の利用に係る制限行為が排除行為に該当するか否かについては，知的財産の利用に関する独占禁止法上の指針（平成１９年９月２８日公正取引委員会）第３の１を参照。また，規格の統一又は標準化につながるような技術の共同研究開発が排除行為に該当するか否かについては，共同研究開発に係る独占禁止法上の指針（平成５年４月２０日公正取引委員会）第１の２（２）及び標準化に伴うパテントプールの形成等に関する独占禁止法上の考え方（平成１７年６月２９日公正取引委員会）第２の２を参照。 (Note 6) Regarding whether conduct of restrictions pertaining to the use of technology falls under Exclusionary Conduct, refer to (1) of Part 3 of the Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act (September 28, 2007, JFTC). Regarding whether joint research and development of technologies that will lead to unification of standards or standardization falls under Exclusionary Conduct, refer to 2 (2) of Part I of the Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development under the Antimonopoly Act (April 20, 1993, JFTC) and 2 of Part 2 of the Guidelines on Standardization and Patent Pool Arrangements (June 29, 2005, JFTC). （注７）ノウハウ（非公知の技術的知識と経験又はそれらの集積であって，その経済価値を事業者自らが保護・管理するものをいう。以下同じ。）の秘密性を保護するために，当該ノウハウの供与先の事業者に対し，原材料・部品の購入先，商品の販売先等を制限するなどの行為が行われることがある。このような行為が排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たっては，後記２から５までの判断要素のほか，当該ノウハウの性質，当該分野における技術水準，原材料や商品の性質，当該ノウハウの取引価値がなくなるまでの期間等の諸事情が総合的に考慮される。 (Note 7) There are cases where in order to the protect secrecy of know-how (meaning any technical knowledge or experience that is not publicly known or any accumulation of them, and thereof the economic value of which is independently protected or controlled by entrepreneurs; the same shall apply hereinafter), such conduct is carried out as imposing restrictions regarding procurement sources of the raw materials or the components of the products or sales destination of the products on the trade partners receiving the said know-how. When assessment is made over whether or not such conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct, comprehensive consideration is given to factors such as the characteristics of the know-how, technology level in the relevant field, characteristics of the raw materials or the product, and duration of the period until the said know-how loses its value for trading, in addition to factors for assessment described in 2 to 5 of Part II below. 例えば，ある製造業者が他の製造業者に対してノウハウを供与して商品の製造を委託する場合や，複数の事業者による共同研究開発によってノウハウを使用した製品を開発し，製造・販売する場合がある。このような場合において，当該ノウハウの供与先の事業者に対し，原材料・部品の購入先，商品の販売先等の制限を課すことは，当該ノウハウの秘密性保持のために必要不可欠な範囲内及び期間内であれば，排除行為に該当するものとはいえない。 For example, there are cases where a manufacturer outsources the manufacturing of products to another manufacturer by providing its know-how to the latter, or where multiple entrepreneurs manufacture or distribute a product that is manufactured by using the know-how developed in their joint research and development. In such cases, imposing restrictions regarding procurement sources of the raw materials or the components of the products or sales destination of the products on trade partners receiving the said know-how would not be deemed to fall under Exclusionary Conduct as far as such conduct is performed within a scope and period essential for protecting the secrecy of the said know-how. ２　商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用を下回る対価設定 2. Below-cost Pricing （１）排除行為に該当し得る行為 (1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct 自由競争経済は，需給の調整を市場メカニズムに委ね，事業者が市場の需給関係に適応しつつ価格決定を行う自由を有することを前提とするものであり，企業努力による価格引下げ競争は，本来，競争政策が維持・促進しようとする能率競争（良質・廉価な商品を提供して顧客を獲得する競争をいう。）の中核をなすものである。このことを踏まえれば，公正かつ自由な競争を促進する独占禁止法の目的に照らし，価格引下げ競争に対する介入は最小限にとどめられるべきである。 The free competition economy is based on the assumption that supply and demand adjustment is left to market mechanism, and entrepreneurs have the freedom to decide their prices by adapting to the supply and demand relationship in the market. Price-cutting competition based on entrepreneurs' own efforts essentially constitutes the core of competition on the merits-competition by which entrepreneurs win customers by supplying high-quality and low-cost products-that competition policies intend to maintain and promote. Therefore, intervention in price-cutting competition should be kept at a minimum in light of the purpose of the Antimonopoly Act, which promotes fair and free competition. しかし，一般に，商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用さえ回収できないような対価を設定すれば，その商品の供給が増大するにつれ損失が拡大することとなるため，このような行為は，特段の事情がない限り，経済合理性のないものである（注８）。したがって，ある商品について，このような対価を設定することによって競争者の顧客を獲得することは，企業努力又は正常な競争過程を反映せず，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせ，競争に悪影響を及ぼす場合がある。このように，ある商品について，その商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用を下回る対価を設定する行為は，排除行為に該当し得る（注９）。 However, generally, when setting a very low price to allow even recovery of the cost, which would not be generated unless the product was supplied, the amount of loss grows larger as the supply of the product increases, so such conduct lacks economic rationality except in extraordinary circumstances (Note 8). Therefore, depriving competitors' customers by setting such a price would not reflect business efforts or the normal competition process and would cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor, thereby possibly undermining the competition. Thus, setting a price below the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied (hereinafter referred to as the "Below-cost Pricing") may fall under Exclusionary Conduct (Note 9). どのような費用が「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」となるかについては，実情に即して合理的と考えられる期間において，商品の供給量の変化に応じて増減する費用であるか否か，商品の供給と密接な関連性を有する費用項目であるか否かという観点から判断される。 Assessment over what costs are regarded as "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied" is made from the viewpoint of whether the cost will increase or decrease depending on the supply quantity of the product and/or whether the cost is closely related with the supply of the product, in a reasonable period in the context of the actual condition. 商品の供給量の変化に応じて増減する費用であるか否かという観点からは，例えば，変動費（操業度に応じて総額において比例的に増減する原価をいう。）は，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」となる。また，明確に変動費であると認められなくても，費用の性格上，供給量の変化に応じてある程度増減するとみられる費用は，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」と推定される。 From the viewpoint of whether the cost will increase or decrease depending on the supply quantity of the product, for example, variable expense-the cost that proportionally increases or decreases in total amount depending on the rate of capacity utilization-is regarded as "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied." When a cost, due to the nature of the cost, is deemed not to be obviously the variable expense but to be increasing or decreasing to a certain degree depending on the changes in supply quantity, it is presumed to be "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied." また，商品の供給と密接な関連性を有する費用項目であるか否かという観点からは，例えば，企業会計上の費用項目のうち，製造原価（商品の製造に要した費用の合計額をいう。）や仕入原価（商品の実質的な仕入価格と運賃等の商品仕入れに付随する諸経費の合計額をいう。）は，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」と推定される。また，同様の観点から，例えば，販売費及び一般管理費のうち，運送費，倉庫費等の注文の履行に要する費用は，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」となる。 From the viewpoint of whether or not the cost is closely related with the supply of the product, for example, production cost (the sum of costs required for producing the product) and purchasing cost (the sum of the actual purchasing cost of the product and miscellaneous expenses pertaining to the purchases, such as the transportation cost) of the expense items for corporate accounting are presumed to be "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied." From the similar point of view, for example, order execution cost such as delivery cost and storage cost within selling cost and general administration cost are presumed to be "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied." なお，ある商品について，その供給に要する費用（注１０）（注１１）を下回り，かつ，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」以上の対価を設定する行為は，当該商品の供給が長期間かつ大量に行われているなどの特段の事情が認められない限り，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせるものとして排除行為となる可能性は低い。 Setting a product price below the cost required for supplying the product (Notes 10 and 11) and not less than "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied" is unlikely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor and to fall under Exclusionary Conduct, except in extraordinary circumstances such as a large amount of the products supplied over a long period. （注８）経済合理性があるか否かについては，概念的には，設定された対価が平均回避可能費用（行為者が商品の追加供給をやめた場合に生じなくなる商品固有の固定費用及び可変費用を合算した費用を追加供給量で除することによって得られる商品一単位当たりの費用をいう。）を回収することができるか否かにより判断される。実務上は，これに相当するものとして「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」を用いる。 (Note 8) Whether it is economically rational is conceptually assessed from whether a price set by the said entrepreneur can cover average avoidable cost (AAC), which is the average of product-specific fixed costs and variable costs that could have been avoided if the said entrepreneur had not produced extra output. On a practical level, the JFTC will substitute "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied" for the AAC. （注９）生鮮食料品のようにその品質が急速に低下するおそれがあるもの，季節商品のようにその販売の最盛期を過ぎたもの，不良品のようにその品質に瑕疵のあるもの等について，相応の低い対価を設定することは，供給に要する費用を下回る対価を設定しても不当とはいえず，排除行為に該当しない。また，価格が需給関係から低落しているときに，これに対応した対価を設定することも同様である。 (Note 9) Properly setting a low price for a product whose quality is likely to deteriorate rapidly, such as perishable food, for a product whose peak sales periods are over, such as a seasonal good, or for a product with quality defects, such as an inferior product, is not deemed unfair even when the price is lower than "the cost that would not be generated unless the product were supplied" and therefore does not fall under Exclusionary Conduct. The same applies to a case in which a low price is properly set for a product when the prices in the market have been lowered because of the supply-demand relationship. （注１０）商品の供給に要する費用とは，商品の供給に要するすべての費用を合算した総費用をいう。企業会計上は，総販売原価がこれに当たり，通常，製造業においては，製造原価に販売費及び一般管理費を加えた費用が，小売業においては，仕入原価に販売費及び一般管理費を加えた費用が総販売原価に該当する。 (Note 10) The cost required for supplying the product refers to the sum of all costs required for supplying a product (average total cost). This corresponds to the gross cost of sales, of the expense items for corporate accounting. Normally, in the manufacturing industry, the gross cost of sales corresponds to the sum of the production cost, selling cost, and general administration cost. In the retail business, the gross cost of sales corresponds to the sum of the purchasing cost, selling cost, and general administration cost. （注１１）複数の事業に共通する費用については，これが各事業にどのように配賦されるかが問題となるところ，企業会計上は，当該費用の発生により各事業が便益を受ける程度等に応じ，各事業者が実情に即して合理的に選択した配賦基準に従って配賦されることが一般的である。複数の事業に共通する費用の配賦基準については，このほかにも様々な方法があるが，行為者が実情に即して合理的に選択した配賦基準を用いていると認められる場合には，当該配賦基準に基づき各事業に費用の配賦を行った上で，総販売原価の算定を行うものとする。 (Note 11) In terms of common costs in multiple businesses, how to allocate such costs to respective businesses becomes an issue, and it is general in corporate accounting that each entrepreneur allocates common costs to each business depending on the degree of benefit given by the generation of the costs, pursuant to the allocation criteria that were reasonably selected by the entrepreneur in the context of the actual condition. In such a case, if the entrepreneur is deemed to use the allocation criteria that were reasonably selected in the context of the actual condition, the gross cost of sales is usually calculated by allocating the common costs based on the said allocation criteria, although there are various allocation criteria. 「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」を下回る対価を設定する行為により，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせる場合には，当該行為は排除行為となる。自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせるか否かを判断するに当たっては，次のような事項が総合的に考慮される。 Where setting a product price below "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied" would cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor, the said conduct is regarded as Exclusionary Conduct. The JFTC will comprehensively consider the following factors to assess whether or not such conduct would cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor. ア　商品に係る市場全体の状況 A. Conditions of the entire market of the product 商品の特性，規模の経済（供給量が増大するにつれ商品一単位当たりの費用が低減することをいう。以下同じ。），商品差別化の程度，流通経路，市場の動向，参入の困難性等が，当該行為が排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether or not Below-cost Pricing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the entire market of the product, such as the characteristics of the product, economies of scale (the product's nature that the larger the supply quantity becomes, the lower the per-unit cost of the product becomes; the same shall apply hereinafter), degree of differentiation of the product, distribution channels, dynamics of the market, and difficulty of market entry. 例えば，商品差別化が進んでいる場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者の商品と競争者の商品のいずれを購入するかの選択に際して需要者が価格に依拠する程度が小さい。したがって，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められにくくなる。 For example, when choosing between the entrepreneur's and competitors' products, customers do not consider prices to be important for highly differentiated products as they would when the products are not differentiated. Therefore, such a case would be unlikely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor. イ　行為者及び競争者の市場における地位 B. Positions of the said entrepreneur and the competitors in the market 行為者及び競争者の商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模（事業所数，営業地域，多角化の状況等），全事業に占める商品の割合等が，当該行為が排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether or not Below-cost Pricing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning positions of the said entrepreneur and the competitors in the market, such as the share of the product, its ranking, brand value of the product, excess supply capacity, scale of operation (number of places of business, business territory, conditions of diversification, etc.), and proportion of the relevant product in all the businesses of the entrepreneur. 例えば，事業規模の大きな事業者が，他の商品の販売による利益その他の資金を投入して損失を補てんしている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」を下回る対価で長期間にわたって供給することが可能であり，効率的な事業者であったとしても通常の企業努力によってこれに対抗することが困難である。したがって，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where an entrepreneur with a large scale of operation engages in Below-cost Pricing while compensating for the loss with profits from sales of other products or with other money, excessive Below-cost Pricing can be continued for a much longer period, making it difficult even for an efficient entrepreneur to compete by normal business efforts. Therefore, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor. ウ　行為の期間及び商品の取引額・数量 C. Period of the conduct and turnover and quantity of the product 「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」を下回る対価が設定されている期間，当該対価で供給される商品の取引額・数量等が，当該行為が排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether or not Below-cost Pricing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors such as the period during which Below-cost Pricing is conducted and the turnover and quantity of the product provided at the said price. 例えば，「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」を下回る対価で長期間にわたって供給している場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, a case where a product is provided over a long period at a price below "the cost that would not be generated unless the product was supplied" would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor. エ　行為の態様 D. Conditions of the conduct 行為者の意図・目的，広告宣伝の状況（廉売に係る行為者の評判を含む。）等が，当該行為が排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether or not Below-cost Pricing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the conduct, such as intent and purpose of an entrepreneur, advertising, and publicity associated with the price-cutting (including the entrepreneur's reputation for price-cutting). 例えば，行為者が他の地域又は他の商品においても「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用」を下回る対価で長期間にわたって供給しているような場合には，行為者による更なる当該対価での供給を警戒して他の事業者が新規参入を躊躇する可能性が高くなる。このように，行為者による当該対価での供給が評判となっていると認められる場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，自らと同等又はそれ以上に効率的な事業者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the said entrepreneur also carries out Below-cost Pricing in other areas or for other products over long period, other entrepreneurs would be more likely to hesitate to enter the market, being cautious about further Below-cost Pricing by the said entrepreneur. Thus, where Below-cost Pricing by the entrepreneur is deemed to be well known, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of an equally or more efficient competitor. Ｘ社は，国内における住宅地図等の大部分を販売している事業者であり，それまで甲市住宅地図等の販売をしていたのはＸ社のみであった。北陸地区において住宅地図等の販売を行っているＹ社が甲市住宅地図等の販売活動を開始したため，Ｘ社は，Ｙ社による販売活動を困難にさせる意図の下，①Ｘ社の特約店をして，甲市ガス局等が指名競争入札の方法等により発注した甲市住宅地図を製造原価を大幅に下回る価格で受注させ，また，②Ｘ社の全額出資子会社をして，Ｙ社の主な販売区域である北陸地区の主要都市において，総販売原価を下回る価格（一部に製造原価を下回る価格を含む。）で平成１０年版の住宅地図等を販売させた。このようなＸ社の行為は，不公正な取引方法（昭和５７年公正取引委員会告示第１５号）の第６項に該当し，独占禁止法第１９条に違反するおそれがあるとされた。（平成１２年３月２４日警告） Company X was an entrepreneur selling most of the maps of the residential areas, etc. of Japan and had been the only company that distributed residential maps of City A. When Company Y-an entrepreneur engaging in the distribution of maps of residential areas etc. in the Hokuriku district-began to engage in selling residential maps of City A, Company X intended to cause difficulty in the selling activities of Company Y by a) making Company X's specified agent set a price excessively below the production cost for residential maps of City A ordered via designated competitive bidding etc. by the Gas Bureau and Waterworks Bureau of City A and b) making its wholly owned subsidiary sell a 1998 edition of residential maps at a price excessively below the gross cost of sales (in part at a price lower than the production cost) in the major cities of the Hokuriku area, which was the main distributing territory of Company Y. Such conduct of Company X was deemed to be likely to fall under paragraph (6) of the Designation of Unfair Trade Practices (JFTC Public Notice No.15 of 1982) and to violate the provisions of Article 19 of the Antimonopoly Act (JFTC warning, March 24, 2000). ３　排他的取引 3. Exclusive Dealing （１）排除行為に該当し得る行為 (1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct 事業者が，相手方に対し，自己の競争者から商品の供給を受けないことを取引の条件としたとしても，競争者が当該相手方に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができる場合には，競争者は，価格，品質等による競争に基づき市場での事業活動を継続して行うことができる。したがって，当該行為は，それ自体で直ちに排除行為となるものではない。 Even if an entrepreneur deals on the condition that the trade partners shall not purchase the products from its competitors, the competitors are able to continue their business activities in the market on the basis of the competition in factors such as prices and product qualities in case that they are able to easily find an alternative trade partner. Therefore, such conduct in itself does not immediately fall under Exclusionary Conduct. しかし，ある事業者が，相手方に対し，自己の競争者との取引を禁止し，又は制限することを取引の条件とすることにより，競争者が当該相手方に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない場合には，その事業活動を困難にさせ，競争に悪影響を及ぼす場合がある。このように，相手方に対し，自己の競争者との取引を禁止し，又は制限することを取引の条件とする行為（以下「排他的取引」という。）は，排除行為に該当し得る（注１２）。 However, where an entrepreneur deals with the trade partners on the condition of prohibition or restraint of transactions with competitors, and the competitors cannot easily find an alternative supply destination to the said trade partner, such conduct may cause difficulties to the business activities of the competitors and therefore may undermine competition. Thus, dealing with the trade partners on the condition of prohibition or restraint of transactions with the competitors (hereinafter referred to as "Exclusive Dealing") may fall under Exclusionary Conduct (Note 12). 排他的取引には，自己の競争者と取引しないことを明示的な契約内容とする行為だけでなく，自己の競争者との取引を禁止し又は制限することを実質的に取引の条件とする行為も含まれる。例えば，自己との取引について一定の取引数量を達成することを条件とする際に，当該取引数量を取引先の取扱能力の限度に近い水準に設定する場合には，自己の競争者との取引を禁止し又は制限することを実質的に取引の条件としているとみることができ，当該行為は排他的取引となる。また，例えば，自己の競争者と取引することについて事前に承諾を得ることを要求する場合なども，経済上何らかの利益又は不利益を伴わせることにより，競争者と取引させないようにする効果を実質的に生じさせているときには，排他的取引となる。 Exclusive Dealing includes not only an entrepreneur's obvious conduct of making a contract that the trade partners shall not have dealings with its competitors but also an entrepreneur's conduct of dealing with its competitors on the substantial condition for prohibition or restraint of the dealings. For example, when achieving a specific quantity of trade is required for dealings, and the said quantity of trade is close to the maximum quantity that the trade partner is capable of dealing (or selling), such conduct can be deemed as prohibiting or restraining dealings with one's competitor as a virtual requirement for the dealing. Thereby, such conduct falls under Exclusive Dealing. In the same manner, for example, requiring one's approval before the trade partners' dealing with one's competitors' falls under Exclusive Dealing when it substantially prevents dealings with one's competitors by providing economic benefit in return or by attaching economic disadvantage. （注１２）例えば，卸売業又は小売業を営む者が，製造業者に対し，自己の競争者との取引を禁止し又は制限することを条件として取引する行為も，「排他的取引」に含まれる。 (Note 12) For example, where an entrepreneur engages in wholesale business or retail business deals with a manufacturer on the condition of prohibition or restraint of transactions with the competitors, such conduct is included in "Exclusive Dealing." 排他的取引により，他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせる場合には，当該行為は排除行為となる。他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせるか否かを判断するに当たっては，次のような事項が総合的に考慮される。 Where Exclusive Dealing would cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner, the said conduct is assessed as Exclusionary Conduct. The JFTC will comprehensively consider the following factors to assess whether or not such conduct would cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner. ア　商品に係る市場全体の状況 A. Conditions of the entire market of the product 市場集中度，商品の特性，規模の経済，商品差別化の程度，流通経路，市場の動向，参入の困難性等が，排他的取引が排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether Exclusive Dealing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the entire market of the product, such as the degree of market concentration, characteristics of the product, economies of scale, degree of differentiation of the product, distribution channels, dynamics of the market, and difficulty of market entry. 例えば，商品の特性としてネットワーク効果（注１３）が認められる場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，排他的取引により競争者の商品を取り扱う事業者が減少するのに伴って競争者の商品の利用価値が低下し，そのことが更なる利用者の減少を招くこととなる。したがって，他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where network effects (Note 13) are recognized as characteristics of the product, a decline in the number of entrepreneurs dealing with the competitors' products would be more likely to lower the utility value of the competitors' products and more likely to lead to further decline in the number of its users, as compared to cases without the network effects. Therefore, in such a case, Exclusive Dealing would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner. イ　行為者の市場における地位 B. Position of the said entrepreneur in the market 行為者の商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模等が，排他的取引が排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether Exclusive Dealing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning position of the said entrepreneur in the market, such as the share of the entrepreneur's product, its ranking, brand value of the product, excess supply capacity, and the scale of operation. 例えば，行為者の商品が強いブランド力を有している場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者の商品の需要が高くなりやすく，行為者から商品の供給を受けることが取引先にとってより重要となる。したがって，他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the said entrepreneur's product has a strong brand value, demand for it would be more likely to increase, and it becomes more important for its trade partners to be supplied with the products from the said entrepreneur. Therefore, in such a case, Exclusive Dealing would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner. ウ　競争者の市場における地位 C. Position of the competitors in the market 競争者の商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模等が，排他的取引が排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether Exclusive Dealing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning position of the competitors in the market, such as the share of the products, their rankings, brand value of the product, excess supply capacity, and scale of operation. 例えば，競争者の商品の供給余力が総じて小さい場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，競争者から商品の供給を受けることによって行為者から受けている供給量のすべてを代替することができないため，行為者から商品の供給を受けることが取引先にとってより重要なものとなる。したがって，他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, when the excess supply capacity of the competitors is small as a whole, it is impossible to completely make up for the whole supply of products that would be provided from the said entrepreneur by purchasing the products from the competitors. Therefore, it is more important for a trade partner to be supplied with the products from the said entrepreneur than when the number of the competitors is not small and the excess supply capacity is large as a whole. Consequently, in such a case, Exclusive Dealing would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner. エ　行為の期間及び相手方の数・シェア D. Period of the conduct, number of trade partners, and their share 排他的取引を行っている期間，排他的取引の相手方の数・シェア等が，排他的取引が排除行為となるかを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether Exclusive Dealing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors such as the period of implementation of the Exclusive Dealing, the number, and the share of the counterparties concerned. 例えば，排他的取引が長期間にわたって行われている場合や排他的取引の相手方の数が多い場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where Exclusive Dealing has been implemented over a long period or is implemented with a large number of counterparties, the Exclusive Dealing would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner. オ　行為の態様 E. Conditions of the conduct 取引の条件・内容，行為者の意図・目的等が，排他的取引が排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 Where assessment is made over whether Exclusive Dealing falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the conduct, such as the conditions and contents of dealing and the intent and purpose of the entrepreneur. 例えば，取引先が競争者と取引をする場合に，取引した分だけ追加的な負担が生じたり，高額の違約金が生じたりするような取引の条件・内容であるときは，そうでない場合と比較して，取引先が競争者の商品を取り扱う際の障害がより大きくなる。したがって，他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, when trade partners are subject to additional charge or a large amount of penalty for their dealing with the said entrepreneur's competitors, because of the conditions and contents of the dealing, they become the greater obstacle for the trade partners to trade with the competitors. Therefore, in such a case, Exclusive Dealing would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the competitors who are unable to easily find an alternative trade partner. （注１３）ネットワーク効果とは，ある技術又は仕様を利用する者が増えることにより，その技術又は仕様の利用価値が高まり，更に多くの利用者を獲得することができる効果をいう。 (Note 13) The network effects refer to effects in which an increase in the number of users of particular technologies or specifications improves the utility value of the technologies or specifications, thereby allowing a further increase in their users. （３）排他的リベートの供与 (3) Exclusive Rebate-giving リベートは，販売促進を目的とするもの，仕切価格の修正としての性格を有するもの等，様々な目的のために利用されている。実際に，リベートは，需要を刺激したり，価格の一要素として市場の実態に即した価格形成を促進させたりするという競争促進的な効果も有する。したがって，リベートの供与自体が直ちに排除行為となるものではない。 Rebates are actually used for a variety of purposes such as sales promotions and adjustment of purchase prices. In fact, rebates have the procompetitive effect to stimulate the demand or, as an element of prices, promote formation of prices that reflect the actual market situation. Therefore, Rebate-giving in itself does not immediately fall under an Exclusionary Conduct. しかし，ある事業者が，相手方に対し，当該事業者からの購入額や購入量，購入額（購入量）全体に占める当該事業者からの購入額（購入量）の割合等が一定期間において一定以上に達することを条件としてリベートを供与することは，取引先に対する競争品の取扱いを制限する効果を有する場合がある。このように，相手方に対し，自己の商品をどの程度取り扱っているか等を条件とすることにより，競争品の取扱いを制限する効果を有するリベートを供与する行為（以下「排他的リベートの供与」という。）は，排他的取引と同様の機能を有するものとして，前記（２）の判断要素に基づき，排除行為に該当するか否かが判断される（注１４）。 However, when an entrepreneur gives rebates to trade partners on the condition that the amount or volume of purchase from the entrepreneur or the proportion of amount (volume) of purchase from the entrepreneur to the total amount (volume) of its purchase reaches a particular threshold or more during a specified period, such conduct may have effects in restraining the trade partners' dealings of competitors' products. Thus, where Rebates-giving to the trade partners on the condition for certain amount of purchase from the alleged entrepreneur etc. has effects in restraining the trade partners' dealings of the competitors' products (Note 14), such conduct (hereinafter referred to as "Exclusive Rebate-giving") may have the same effect as Exclusive Dealing. Therefore, whether such conduct falls under Exclusionary Conduct will be determined on the basis of the factors for assessment described in (2) above. リベートの供与が，取引先に対する競争品の取扱いを制限する効果を有し，排他的取引と同様の機能を有するものといえるか否かを判断するに当たっては，次のような事項が総合的に考慮される。 The JFTC will comprehensively consider the following factors to assess whether or not Rebates-giving has an effect in restraining the dealings of competitors' products and have the same effect as Exclusive Dealing. ア　リベートの水準 A. Level of rebates リベートの金額や供与率の水準が高く設定されている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，取引先が行為者からより多くの商品を購入する可能性が高くなる。したがって，競争品の取扱いを制限する効果が高くなる。 Where the amount or rate of rebates is set at a higher level, the trade partners would be more likely to purchase more products from the entrepreneur. Such Rebate-giving is highly effective in restraining the dealings of competitors' products. イ　リベートを供与する基準 B. Threshold of giving rebates リベートを供与する基準が取引先の達成可能な範囲内で高い水準に設定されている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者の商品を競争品よりも優先的に取り扱わせる機能が強く働き，取引先が行為者からより多くの商品を購入する可能性が高くなる。したがって，競争品の取扱いを制限する効果が高くなる。 Where threshold for Rebates-giving is set at the higher level within the achievable range for the trade partners, the rebates function more effectively to have the trade partners deal with products from the entrepreneur with greater preference than with those from the competitors, and the trade partners would be more likely to purchase more products from the entrepreneur. また，取引先ごとにリベートを供与する基準が設定されている場合は，取引先全体に対して一律の基準が設定されている場合と比較して，行為者は，自らの商品を競争品よりも優先的に取り扱わせる機能が最も強く働くように，リベートを供与する基準を取引先の個別事情に応じて設定することができるため，取引先が行為者からより多くの商品を購入する可能性が高くなる。したがって，競争品の取扱いを制限する効果が高くなる。 Where rebate-giving is set an individual threshold for each trade partner, the trade partners would be more likely to purchase more products from the entrepreneur than when the same criteria are set for all the trade partners, because the entrepreneur can set the criteria in accordance with the individual circumstances of each trade partner so that the rebates function more effectively to have the trade partners deal with the entrepreneur's products with greater preference than with the competitors' products. Such Rebates-giving is highly effective in restraining the dealings of competitors' products in such a case. ウ　リベートの累進度 C. Progressiveness of rebates 一定期間における取引数量等に応じて累進的にリベートの水準が設定されている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者の商品を競争品よりも優先的に取り扱わせる機能が強く働き，取引先が行為者からより多くの商品を購入する可能性が高くなる。したがって，競争品の取扱いを制限する効果が高くなる。 When the level of rebates is progressively set in accordance with the quantity of trade etc. in a specified period, the rebates function more effectively to have the trade partners to deal with products from the entrepreneur with greater preference than with those from the competitors, and the trade partners would be more likely to purchase more products from the entrepreneur. Such Rebates-giving is highly effective in restraining the dealings of the competitors' products. エ　リベートの遡及性 D. Retro-activeness of rebates 実際の取引数量等がリベートを供与する基準を超えた際に，リベートがそれまでの取引数量等の全体について供与される場合は，設定された基準を超えて取引された取引数量等についてのみ供与される場合と比較して，行為者の商品を競争品よりも優先的に取り扱わせる機能が強く働き，取引先が行為者からより多くの商品を購入する可能性が高くなる。したがって，競争品の取扱いを制限する効果が高くなる。 If rebates are given for the entire quantity of trade made thus far in case that the quantity of trade has exceeded a certain threshold, the rebates function more effectively in having the trade partners deal with products from the entrepreneur with greater preference than with those from the competitors, and the trade partners would be more likely to purchase more products from the entrepreneur than when rebates are given only for the portion of the quantity of trade etc., which exceed the threshold required for Rebates-giving. Such Rebate-giving is highly effective in restraining the dealings of competitors' products. （注１４）排他的リベートの供与自体が排他的取引と同様の機能を有する場合のほか，排他的取引による競争品の取扱いの制限の実効性を確保するための手段としてリベートが用いられる場合もある。 (Note 14) In addition to cases in which Exclusive Rebate-giving in itself functions in the same way as Exclusive Dealing, there are cases where rebates are used to ensure the effectiveness of Exclusive Dealing in restraining the dealings of competitive products. ア　Ｘ社は，専ら放射性医薬品の原料として使用されるモリブデン９９の世界における生産数量の過半を製造し，世界における販売数量の大部分を販売していた。当該放射性医薬品は，モリブデン９９以外の原料によって製造することはできないところ，我が国においてモリブデン９９を購入して当該放射性医薬品を製造している事業者は２社であり，当該２社はモリブデン９９の全量をＸ社から購入してきた。Ｘ社は，当該２社との間で，その取得，使用，消費又は加工するモリブデン９９の全量をＸ社から購入しなければならない旨の規定を含む１０年間の契約を締結することにより，他のモリブデン９９の製造販売業者が当該２社との取引をできないようにした。このようなＸ社の行為は，他のモリブデン９９の製造販売業者の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された。（平成１０年９月３日勧告審決，平成１０年（勧）第１６号） A. Company X manufactured more than half of all the globally produced molybdenum-99-a raw material for a particular radiopharmaceutical-and distributed the majority of molybdenum-99 worldwide. The said radiopharmaceutical cannot be produced from any other raw material but molybdenum-99. In Japan, there were two companies that had purchased molybdenum-99 and produced the said radiopharmaceutical, and the two companies had bought molybdenum-99 only from Company X. Company X prevented other producers and distributors of molybdenum-99 from dealing with the two companies through concluding agreements with them for 10 years, including the provision under which the two companies purchased all the molybdenum-99 that they acquire, use, consume, or process only from Company X. Such conduct by Company X was deemed to exclude the business activities of other producers of molybdenum-99 (JFTC recommendation decision, September 3, 1998). イ　Ａ社は，注射液等の容器として使用されるアンプル用生地管の我が国で唯一の製造業者である。アンプル用生地管を加工してアンプルを製造販売する業者（アンプル加工業者）は，需要者である製薬会社が使用を望むＡ社製生地管を取り扱うことが必要不可欠であった。このような状況のもとで，Ａ社から西日本における供給を一手に受けているＸ社は，Ａ社製生地管とともに輸入生地管を購入し加工して製薬会社に販売するＹ社グループに対し，輸入生地管の取扱いの継続又は拡大を牽制し，これに対して制裁を加える目的で，①Ｙ社グループに対してのみ，販売価格の引上げ，手形サイトの短縮及び特別値引きの取りやめを申し入れ，②Ｙ社グループが輸入している生地管と同品種のアンプル用生地管の供給を拒絶し，③Ｙ社グループの生地管購入代金債務に対する担保の差入れ又は現金決済のいずれかの条件を満たさない限り生地管の取引には応じないとした。これらのＸ社の行為は，Ｙ社グループの輸入生地管を取り扱う事業活動を排除し，Ｘ社の競争者である外国の生地管製造業者の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された。（平成１８年６月５日審判審決，平成１２年（判）第８号） B. Company A was the only entrepreneur in Japan producing glass tubes as raw materials for ampoules, which is used as a container of injection solution. It is essential for companies manufacturing ampoules by processing the glass tubes for ampoules and distributing the ampoules (ampoule processors) to use Company A's glass tubes as the users of ampoules; pharmaceutical companies preferred ampoules made using Company A's glass tubes. Under such circumstances, Company X, the only company supplied with Company A's products in Western Japan, intended to halt the continuation or expansion of trade of imported glass tubes by Company Group Y, which purchased imported glass tubes along with those from Company A for processing them into ampoules and selling them to pharmaceutical companies etc. and to enforce sanctions against Company Group Y for such conduct, by a) calling for a shortened term of promissory notes, price increase, and total abolition of the special price discount only to Company Group Y; b) refusing to supply to Company Group Y the same type of glass tubes as those imported by Company Group Y; and c) expressing its intention to terminate transactions with Company Group Y, unless Company Group Y accepted cash settlement or furnished security for its debts to Company X generated from purchases. Such conduct by Company X was deemed to exclude the business activities of company group Y in dealing with imported glass tubes and to exclude the business activities of the foreign glass tube manufacturers, which competed with Company X (JFTC hearing decision, June 5, 2006). ウ　Ｘ社は，ＣＰＵを製造販売するＡ社の日本子会社であり，我が国においてＡ社製ＣＰＵの販売を行っている。Ｘ社が販売するＡ社製ＣＰＵは，国内のパソコン製造販売業者に対するＣＰＵの総販売数量の大部分（約８９パーセント）を占めており，強いブランド力を有している。Ｘ社は，ＣＰＵを購入している国内のパソコン製造販売業者５社（合計でＣＰＵの国内総販売数量の約７７パーセント）に対し，①製造販売するパソコンに搭載するＣＰＵの数量のうちＡ社製ＣＰＵの数量が占める割合を１００パーセントとし，競争者製ＣＰＵを採用しないこと，②同割合を９０パーセントとし，競争者製ＣＰＵの割合を１０パーセントに抑えること，③生産数量の比較的多い複数の商品群に属するすべてのパソコンに搭載するＣＰＵについて競争者製ＣＰＵを採用しないことのいずれかを条件として，割戻金又は資金を提供することを約束した。このようなＸ社の行為は，競争者製ＣＰＵを採用しないようにさせるものであり，国内のパソコン製造販売業者５社に対するＣＰＵの販売に係る競争者の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された。（平成１７年４月１３日勧告審決，平成１７年（勧）第１号） C. Company X was the Japanese subsidiary of Company A, which engaged in manufacturing and distributing CPUs, and distributed CPUs manufactured by Company A in Japan. Company A's CPUs, which Company X had sold, made up a substantial percentage (approximately 89%) of all CPUs distributed in Japan and had a strong brand value. Under these circumstances, Company X promised to offer rebates or financial support to the five PC manufactures in Japan (which held approximately 77% share of the total CPUs distributed in Japan) that purchased CPUs for the manufacturing and distribution of PCs, on the following conditions: a) The proportion of Company A's CPUs used in the PCs manufactured and distributed would approach 100%, and the five PC manufactures would not use competitors' CPUs; b) the said proportion would be maintained at 90%, with competitors' CPUs at 10%; or c) they would refrain from incorporating the CPUs of Company Y's competitors into PCs in more than one series with a large amount of production volume relative to others. Such conduct by Company X was deemed to induce the five PC manufactures to refrain from incorporating the competitors' CPUs and to exclude the business activities of the competitors in distributing CPUs to them (JFTC recommendation decision, April 13, 2005). ４　抱き合わせ 4. Tying （１）排除行為に該当し得る行為 (1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct 複数の商品を組み合わせることにより，新たな価値を加えて相手方に商品を提供することは，技術革新・販売促進の手法の一つである。したがって，当該行為は，それ自体で直ちに排除行為となるものではない。 Adding new value by offering multiple products tied or integrated together to the trade partners is a method of technological innovation and sales promotion. Therefore, such conduct in itself does not immediately fall under Exclusionary Conduct. しかし，ある事業者が，相手方に対し，ある商品（主たる商品）の供給に併せて他の商品（従たる商品）を購入させることは，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせ，従たる商品の市場における競争に悪影響を及ぼす場合がある。このように，相手方に対し，ある商品の供給（又は購入）に併せて他の商品を購入（又は供給）させる行為（以下「抱き合わせ」という。）は，排除行為に該当し得る（注１５）。 However, where an entrepreneur supplies one product (tying product) only on the condition that the trade partners also purchase another product (tied product) may cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product, and therefore may undermine competition in the market of the tied product. Thus, supplying (or purchasing) only on the condition that the trade partners also purchase (or supply) another product (hereinafter referred to as "Tying") may fall under Exclusionary Conduct (Note 15). ある商品の供給に併せて購入させる商品が「他の商品」といえるか否かについては，組み合わされた商品がそれぞれ独自性を有し，独立して取引の対象とされているか否かという観点から判断される。具体的には，判断に当たって，それぞれの商品について，需要者が異なるか，内容・機能が異なるか（組み合わされた商品の内容・機能が抱き合わせ前のそれぞれの商品と比べて実質的に変わっているかを含む。），需要者が単品で購入することができるか（組み合わされた商品が通常一つの単位として販売又は使用されているかを含む。）等の点が総合的に考慮される。例えば，携帯電話機にデジタルカメラを組み合わせて販売されるカメラ付携帯電話機は，携帯電話機やデジタルカメラそれぞれと比べてカメラ付携帯電話機の内容・機能に実質的な変更がもたらされることから，別個の特徴を持つ単一の商品と評価することができる。この場合，購入させられる商品（デジタルカメラ）が「他の商品」であるとはいえない。 Assessment over whether or not the product required to purchase on condition for the supply of a product is deemed to be "another product" is made from the viewpoint of whether or not each of the combined product has a distinctive character and is traded independently. Specifically, comprehensive consideration is given to the respective products in terms of factors such as whether the users are different from each other, whether the contents and functions are different from each other (including whether the contents and functions of the combined products differ substantially from those of each product before combination), and whether the users can separately purchase each of them (including whether each of the combined products is normally sold or used as a single unit). For example, in case that a cellular phone integrates a digital camera into itself, the contents and functions of the cellular phone with a digital camera will be substantially changed when compared to those of a cellular phone or a digital camera that are sold separately, and therefore, the cellular phone with a digital camera can be regarded as a single product with distinct functions. In this case, the product-digital camera-that the trade partners are required to purchase under the condition for the trade is not deemed to be "another product." また，行為者の主たる商品と従たる商品を別々に購入することができる場合であっても，従たる商品とは別に購入することができる行為者の主たる商品の供給量が少ないため，多くの需要者が行為者の主たる商品とともにその従たる商品をも購入することとなるときは，実質的に他の商品を購入させているのと同様であると認められる。また，抱き合わせによって組み合わされた商品の価格が行為者の主たる商品及び従たる商品を別々に購入した場合の合計額よりも低くなるため多くの需要者が引き付けられるときも，実質的に他の商品を購入させているのと同様であると認められる（注１６）。 Even if the tying and the tied products supplied by the alleged entrepreneur can be purchased separately, or if the quantity of the tying product offered separately from the tied product is small, and many users consequently will purchase the tied and the tying products together, it is deemed to substantially make the trade partners purchase another product. In addition, when the price of the product combined together is lower than the sum of the prices of the tying product and tied product, thereby attracting more users, it is also deemed to substantially make the trade partners purchase another product. (Note 16) （注１５）事業者がある商品を供給するのに併せて相手方に他の商品を供給させる行為も，事業者がある商品を購入するのに併せて相手方に他の商品を購入させる行為も，それぞれ，「抱き合わせ」に含まれる。 (Note 15) Tying includes such conduct that an entrepreneur supplies one product only on the condition that the trade partners also supply another product and that an entrepreneur purchases a product only on the condition that the trade partners purchase another product. また，ある商品を購入した後に必要となる補完的商品に係る市場（いわゆるアフターマーケット）において特定の商品を購入させる行為も，「抱き合わせ」に含まれる。 In addition, Tying includes such conduct that an entrepreneur supplies a product only on the condition that the trade partners purchase a particular product in the market of supplementary products-so-called aftermarket -that will be needed after the product is purchased. （注１６）主たる商品と従たる商品を組み合わせて供給する場合に価格を割安とする行為にあっては，行為者と従たる商品の市場における競争者との間に，抱き合わせによって組み合わされた商品（主たる商品と従たる商品のセット）についての競争関係が成り立つ場合がある。例えば，従たる商品の市場における競争者が，行為者の主たる商品と同程度の品質・ブランド力を有する商品を，従前から組み合わせて供給している場合や特段の追加的な費用を生ずることなく組み合わせて供給することが可能な場合がこれに当たる。このような場合には，当該競争者との間の競争関係については，前記２の「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用を下回る対価設定」の観点から排除行為に該当するか否かが判断される。 (Note 16) With respect to offering a discount for the tying and the tied products supplied in combination, there are cases where such conduct leads to competition regarding the combined product (a package of the tying and the tied products) between the alleged entrepreneur and its competitors in the market of the tied product. For example, this includes the case where a competitor in the market of the tied product has actually been supplying, or it can supply without particular additional costs, a product that is equal in quality and brand value to that of the tying product of the alleged entrepreneur. In such a case, assessment over whether or not such conduct against the said competitor falls under Exclusionary Conduct is made from the viewpoint of "Below-cost Pricing" (in 2 above). 抱き合わせにより，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせる場合には，当該行為は排除行為となる。従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせるか否かを判断するに当たっては，次のような事項が総合的に考慮される。 Where Tying causes difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product, the said conduct is regarded as Exclusionary Conduct. The JFTC will comprehensively consider the following factors to assess whether or not such conduct would cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product. ア　主たる商品及び従たる商品に係る市場全体の状況 A. Conditions of the entire market of the tying and the tied products 主たる商品及び従たる商品についての市場集中度，商品の特性，規模の経済，商品差別化の程度，流通経路，市場の動向，参入の困難性等が，抱き合わせが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Tying falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the entire market of the tying and the tied products, such as degree of market concentration, characteristics of the products, economies of scale, degree of differentiation of the products, distribution channels, dynamics of the market, and difficulty of market entry. 例えば，従たる商品の市場における商品差別化が進んでいない場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者の従たる商品が購入されることにより競争者の従たる商品が購入されなくなるおそれが高い。したがって，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the tied product is not differentiated in the market, it would be more likely that purchases of tied product from the alleged entrepreneur may prevent competitors' tied products from being purchased. Therefore, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product. イ　主たる商品の市場における行為者の地位 B. Position of the said entrepreneur in the market of the tying product 行為者の主たる商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模等が，抱き合わせが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Tying falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning position of the said entrepreneur in the market of the tying product, such as the share of the tying product, its ranking, brand value of the tying product, excess supply capacity, and scale of operation. 例えば，行為者の主たる商品のシェアが大きい場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，より多くの従たる商品が抱き合わせによって供給されやすくなる。したがって，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the entrepreneur has a large share of the tying product, more tied products from the entrepreneur would be more likely to be supplied through tying than when the entrepreneur's share is not large. Therefore, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product. ウ　従たる商品の市場における行為者及び競争者の地位 C. Positions of the said entrepreneur and its competitors in the market of the tied product 行為者及び競争者の従たる商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模等が，抱き合わせが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Tying falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning positions of the said entrepreneur and its competitors in the market of the tied product, such as the share of the tied product, their ranking, brand value of the tied product, excess supply capacity, and scale of operations. 例えば，行為者の従たる商品の供給余力が十分に認められる場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，抱き合わせによって供給される従たる商品の取引数量が限定されることがない。したがって，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the entrepreneur is deemed to have large excess supply capacity for the tied product, the quantity of trade of the tied products supplied through tying is less likely to be limited. Therefore, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product. エ　行為の期間及び相手方の数・取引数量 D. Period of the conduct, number of the trade partners, and quantity of transaction 抱き合わせを行っている期間，抱き合わせの対象となる取引の相手方の数・取引数量等が，抱き合わせが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Tying falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors such as the length of period during which tying has been implemented, the number of counterparties for whom the tying is intended, and the quantity of trade. 例えば，抱き合わせが長期間にわたって行われている場合や，抱き合わせの対象となる取引の相手方の数が多い場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where Tying has been implemented over a long period or where the number of counterparties, which the tying is related to, is large, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product. オ　行為の態様 E. Conditions of the conduct 抱き合わせによって組み合わされた商品の価格，抱き合わせの条件・強制の程度，行為者の意図・目的等が，抱き合わせが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Tying falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the conduct, such as the price of the products tied together, condition for the tying, and the degree of forcing by the condition for Tying, and intent and purpose of the entrepreneur. 例えば，抱き合わせによって組み合わされた商品について，主たる商品の機能を害さずに従たる商品を取り外し又は無効にすることができるとしても，これに多くの費用や時間を要する場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，多くの需要者が組み合わされた従たる商品をそのまま使用することが予想される。したがって，従たる商品の市場において他に代わり得る取引先を容易に見いだすことができない競争者の事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, even when products combined through tying permit the removal or reverse of the tied product without damaging the functions of the tying product, if the said removal or disabling requires a large cost or time, more users are expected to use the tied product as is. Therefore, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied product. ア　Ｘ社及びＹ社はパソコン用ソフトウェアの開発及びライセンスの供与に係る事業を営む者である。Ｘ社の表計算ソフト及びＹ社のワープロソフトは，それぞれ，市場シェア第１位であった。Ｘ社は，自社と競合するＹ社のワープロソフトのみがパソコン本体に搭載されて販売されることは，Ｘ社のワープロソフトの市場シェアを高める上で重大な障害となるものと危惧し，パソコン製造販売業者に対し，Ｘ社の表計算ソフトとワープロソフトを併せてパソコン本体に搭載して出荷する契約を受け入れさせた。これにより，パソコン製造販売業者はＸ社の表計算ソフトとワープロソフトを併せて搭載したパソコンを発売し，Ｘ社のワープロソフトの市場シェアが拡大して市場シェア第１位を占めるに至った。このようなＸ社の行為は，不公正な取引方法（昭和５７年公正取引委員会告示第１５号）の第１０項に該当し，独占禁止法第１９条の規定に違反するとされた。（平成１０年１２月１４日勧告審決，平成１０年（勧）第２１号） A. Company X was an entrepreneur engaging in business related to development and licensing of PC software. The spreadsheet software of Company X and word processing software of Company Y had the largest shares in their respective markets. Company X feared that distribution of PCs equipped with only the word processing software of its competitor, Company Y, would seriously interfere with Company X's activities for increasing the market share of its word processing software, and it made entrepreneurs engaging in manufacturing and distribution of PCs accept contracts under which both the spreadsheet software and word processing software of Company X were to be installed in their PCs. Because of this contract, the said entrepreneurs sold PCs incorporating both the spreadsheet software and word processing software of Company X and, consequently, the share of Company X's word-processing software increased and became the largest in the market. Such conduct by Company X was deemed to fall under (10) of the Designation of Unfair Trade Practices (JFTC Public Notice No. 15 of 1982) and to violate the provisions of Article 19 of the Antimonopoly Act (JFTC recommendation decision, December 14, 1998). イ　Ｘ社は，エレベーターの製造販売業を営むＡ社の子会社であり，主としてＡ社製エレベーターの保守点検業を営むとともに，Ａ社製エレベーターの部品を一手に販売していた。Ｂ社は，Ａ社製エレベーターを設置するビルを所有し，独立系保守業者Ｙ社との間で保守点検契約を締結していた。Ｂ社所有のＡ社製エレベーターを修理するには部品の交換が必要であるため，Ｂ社がＸ社に部品を注文したところ，Ｘ社は，①部品のみの販売はしない，部品の取替え・修理・調整工事をＸ社に併せて発注するのでなければ注文には応じない，また，部品の納期は３か月先である旨の回答をし，②その後の再度の注文にもかかわらず，Ｂ社に部品を供給しなかった。このようなＸ社の行為は，不公正な取引方法（昭和５７年公正取引委員会告示第１５号）の第１０項に該当し，独占禁止法第１９条の規定に違反するとされた。（大阪高判平成５年７月３０日，平成２年（ネ）第１６６０号） B. Company X was a subsidiary of Company A, which manufactured and distributed elevators. Company X engaged mainly in the maintenance of elevators manufactured by Company A and was the sole distributor of components of elevators manufactured by Company A. Company B owned buildings equipped with elevators manufactured by Company A and concluded a maintenance contract with regard to the said elevators with an independent maintenance Company Y. Company B ordered particular components of elevators manufactured by Company A from Company X because it was necessary to replace the components in order to repair the elevators. Company X a) responded that it would not sell only the components; would not accept the order unless Company B also would order Company X a service for replacement, repair, and adjustment related to the components; and would deliver the components three months later and b) did not supply the components to Company B although the order for the components was made again later. Such conduct by Company X was deemed to fall under (10) of the Designation of Unfair Trade Practices (JFTC Public Notice No.15 of 1982) and to violate the provisions of Article 19 of the Antimonopoly Act (Osaka High Court Judgment, July 30, 1993). ５　供給拒絶・差別的取扱い 5. Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment （１）排除行為に該当し得る行為 (1) Conduct that may fall under Exclusionary Conduct 事業者が，誰に商品を供給するか，どのような条件で商品を供給するかは，基本的には事業者の自由である。したがって，事業者が独立した事業主体として，商品の供給先を選択し，供給先事業者（新たに供給を受けようとする事業者を含む。以下同じ。）との間で供給に係る取引の内容，実績等を考慮して供給の条件を定めることは，原則として排除行為となるものではない。 An entrepreneur basically has the discretion to select to whom and on what conditions it supplies products. Accordingly, if an entrepreneur independently selects a party to whom the product is supplied and determines the conditions for supply in consideration of the details and results of transactions for supply to the trading customers (including entrants intending to be supplied with the products; the same shall apply hereinafter), it does not fall under Exclusionary Conduct in principle. しかし，ある事業者が，供給先事業者が市場（川下市場）で事業活動を行うために必要な商品を供給する市場（川上市場）において，合理的な範囲を超えて，供給の拒絶，供給に係る商品の数量若しくは内容の制限又は供給の条件若しくは実施についての差別的な取扱い（以下「供給拒絶等」という。）をすることは，川上市場においてその事業者に代わり得る他の供給者を容易に見いだすことができない供給先事業者（以下「拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者」という。）の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせ，川下市場における競争に悪影響を及ぼす場合がある。このように，供給先事業者が市場（川下市場）で事業活動を行うために必要な商品について，合理的な範囲を超えて供給拒絶等をする行為（以下「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」という。）は，排除行為に該当し得る（注１７）（注１８）。 However, if an entrepreneur carries out, beyond reasonable degree, refusal to supply, imposing restriction on the quantity or contents, or applies discriminatory treatment to the condition or implementation of supply in the upstream market (hereinafter referred to as "Refusals") concerning a product necessary for the trading customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market, such conduct may cause difficulty in the business activities in the downstream market of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market, and may undermine competition in the downstream market. Thus, carrying out Refusals, beyond reasonable degree, concerning a product necessary for the trading customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market (hereinafter referred to as "Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment") may fall under Exclusionary Conduct (Notes 17 and 18). 供給する商品が「供給先事業者が市場（川下市場）で事業活動を行うために必要な商品」といえるか否かについては，供給先事業者が川下市場で事業活動を行うに当たって他の商品では代替できない必須の商品であって，自ら投資，技術開発等を行うことにより同種の商品を新たに製造することが現実的に困難と認められるものであるか否かの観点から判断される。また，規模の経済又はネットワーク効果が強く認められる事業分野においては，国その他の公的主体が排他的に利用権等を割り当てていた施設等を有する機関が民営化されて事業を営んでいる場合がある。このような場合，当該施設等を利用することができなければ，事業者が川下市場において事業活動を行うことは困難であることが多い。したがって，当該施設等の利用許諾は，「供給先事業者が市場（川下市場）で事業活動を行うために必要な商品」に該当するものが多いと考えられる。 Whether or not a product in the upstream market can be considered to be "a product necessary for the trading customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market" will be assessed from the viewpoint of whether or not a) the product is an unsubstitutable and indispensable product for the trading customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market and b) it is impossible in reality for the trading customers to produce the product through the trading customer's own effort, such as investment and technological development. In an area of business where the economies of scale or network effects work strongly, there are some cases where organizations with facilities, the right of use of which was exclusively assigned by the nation or other public entities, were privatized. In such a case, if other entrepreneurs cannot use the organizations' facilities, it may be often difficult for them to carry out the business activities in the downstream market. As a result, it is considered that services for the use of those facilities may often fall under "a product necessary for the trading customers to carry out business activities in the downstream market." 供給拒絶等をすることが「合理的な範囲」を超えているか否かを判断するに当たっては，供給に係る取引の内容及び実績，地域による需給関係等の相違が具体的に考慮される。例えば，行為者が一部の供給先事業者に対して供給する川上市場における商品の価格が，他の供給先事業者との取引数量の相違等に基づく正当なコスト差を著しく超えて廉価となっている場合には，このような価格の差は合理的な範囲を超えているといえる。他方，例えば，川上市場における商品について行為者が長期間にわたって継続的に供給を行ってきた事業者に対する決済条件，配送条件その他の供給に係る条件が，新規に供給を受けようとする事業者に対する条件と異なっている場合であっても，それが過去の実績の相違に基づく正当なものであるときは，このような取扱いの差は合理的な範囲を超えているとはいえない。 Whether or not the Refusals goes "beyond reasonable degree" will be concretely assessed from the viewpoint of the details and results of transactions for supply and any differences in the relationship between supply and demand according to region. For example, if the price of products that an entrepreneur supplies to some trading customers in the upstream market is significantly low, exceeding the appropriate differences in the costs depending on the difference in trading volume between purchasing entrepreneurs, such price difference will be deemed to go beyond reasonable degree. Meanwhile, for example, if the settlement conditions, delivery conditions, and other supply conditions for an entrepreneur who has supplied products in the upstream market for a long time are different from those for another entrepreneur who is going to be newly supplied, although they are appropriately based on differences in past results, such difference in conditions in treatment would not be deemed to go beyond reasonable degree. なお，事業者が独立した事業主体として行った供給先の選択や供給に係る条件の設定は，基本的には，事業者による自由な事業活動として尊重されるべきである。したがって，事業者が単独で行う「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」については，排除行為に該当するか否かが特に慎重に判断される必要がある。 In principle, the selection of purchasers and the establishment of supply conditions independently made by an entrepreneur should be respected as discretion of the entrepreneur. Accordingly, whether or not Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment by a single entrepreneur falls under Exclusionary Conduct should be assessed especially prudently. （注１７）川下市場で事業活動を行うために必要な商品を供給する川上市場における事業者が，自ら川下市場においても事業活動を行っている場合がある。このような場合において，供給先事業者に供給する川上市場における商品の価格について，自らの川下市場における商品の価格よりも高い水準に設定したり，供給先事業者が経済的合理性のある事業活動によって対抗できないほど近接した価格に設定したりする行為（いわゆるマージンスクイーズ）は，「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」と同様の観点から排除行為に該当するか否かが判断される。 (Note 17) There are cases where an entrepreneur in the upstream market who supplies products that are necessary for carrying out business activities in the downstream market and also carries out business activities in the downstream market. In this case, whether or not the conduct of setting a price of its product in the upstream market at a level higher than that in the downstream market or setting a price that are so close as to interfere with the trading customers from countering by economically reasonable business activities (so-called margin squeeze) falls under Exclusionary Conduct will be determined from the same viewpoint as Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment. （注１８）例えば，川下市場において卸売業又は小売業を営む者であって，川上市場における商品を川下市場で販売するために必須の販売網等の流通経路を有する者が，これを新たに構築することが現実的に困難な川上市場における製造業者等に対し，合理的な範囲を超えて，購入の拒絶や差別的な取扱いをすることについては，「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」と同様の観点から排除行為に該当するか否かが判断される。 (Note 18) For example, if an entrepreneur, who engages in wholesale business or retail business in the downstream market and has distribution channels such as a sales network, which is indispensable for selling products in the downstream market, refuses to purchase from a manufacturer or treats a manufacturer discriminately beyond reasonable degree in the upstream market, there are cases that the manufacturer has difficulty in establishing a new distribution channel in the downstream market in reality. In such cases, whether or not the entrepreneur's conduct in the downstream market falls under Exclusionary Conduct will be determined from the same viewpoint as Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment. 供給拒絶・差別的取扱いにより，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせる場合には，当該行為は排除行為となる。当該行為によって，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせるか否かを判断するに当たっては，次のような事項が総合的に考慮される。 Where Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment would cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market, the said conduct is regarded as Exclusionary Conduct. The JFTC will comprehensively consider the following factors to assess whether or not such conduct would cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. ア　川上市場及び川下市場全体の状況 A. Entire conditions of the upstream market and the downstream market 川上市場及び川下市場における市場集中度，商品の特性，規模の経済，商品差別化の程度，流通経路，市場の動向，参入の困難性等が，供給拒絶・差別的取扱いが排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment fall under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning entire conditions of the upstream market and the downstream market, such as degree of market concentration, the characteristics of the products, economies of scale, the degree of differentiation of products, distribution channels, dynamics of the market, and difficulty in entry into the upstream and downstream markets. 例えば，川上市場が市場集中度の高い高度に寡占的な市場である場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，供給先事業者は川上市場において行為者に代わり得る他の供給者を容易に見いだすことができず，行為者から川上市場における商品の供給を受けることが供給先事業者の事業活動にとってより重要となる。したがって，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the upstream market is a highly oligopolistic market with a high degree of market concentration, the trading customers will not easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. The supply of products by the entrepreneur in the upstream market will, therefore, be more critical for the business activities of the trading customers. Accordingly, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. イ　川上市場における行為者及びその競争者の地位 B. Positions of the said entrepreneur and its competitors in the upstream market 川上市場における行為者及びその競争者の商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模等が，供給拒絶・差別的取扱いが排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment fall under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning positions of the said entrepreneur and its competitors in the upstream market, such as the market share of products, the rankings, brand value of the product, excess supply capacity, and business sizes of the trading customers and its competitors in the upstream market. 例えば，行為者の川上市場における商品が強いブランド力を有している場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，供給先事業者は川上市場において行為者に代わり得る他の供給者を容易に見いだすことができず，行為者から川上市場における商品の供給を受けることが供給先事業者の事業活動にとってより重要となる。この場合，行為者の競争者の事業規模が小さく，その商品の供給余力が乏しければ，より一層行為者の重要性が増す。したがって，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, where the products of an entrepreneur have strong brand value in the upstream market, the trading customers will not easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. The supply of products by the entrepreneur in the upstream market will, therefore, be more critical for the trading customers. In this case, if the business sizes of the entrepreneur's competitors are small and their excess supply capacities of the product are limited, the importance of the entrepreneur will increase further. Accordingly, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. ウ　川下市場における供給先事業者の地位 C. Positions of the trading customers in the downstream market 川下市場における供給先事業者の商品のシェア，その順位，ブランド力，供給余力，事業規模等が，供給拒絶・差別的取扱いが排除行為に該当するか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning positions of the trading customers in the downstream market, such as the market share of products, the rankings, brand value of the product, excess supply capacity, and business sizes of the trading customers in the downstream market. 例えば，供給先事業者の川下市場における商品のシェアが大きく，その商品が強いブランド力を有している場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，供給先事業者は川上市場において行為者に代わり得る他の供給者を容易に見いだすことができ，行為者から川上市場における商品の供給を受けることが供給先事業者の事業活動にとって重要とはならない。したがって，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせると認められにくくなる。 For example, if the product of the trading customers has a large share and a very strong brand value in the downstream market, the trading customers will not easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. In this case, the supply of products by the entrepreneur in the upstream market will be less critical to the business activities of the trading customers. Accordingly, such a case would be more unlikely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. エ　行為の期間 D. Period of the conduct 供給拒絶・差別的取扱いを行っている期間等が，供給拒絶・差別的取扱いが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment falls under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors such as the period of Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment. 例えば，供給拒絶・差別的取扱いが長期間にわたって行われている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, if the Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment occurs over a long period, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. オ　行為の態様 E. Conditions of the conduct 行為者の川上市場における商品の価格，供給先事業者との取引の条件・内容，行為者の意図・目的等が，供給拒絶・差別的取扱いが排除行為となるか否かを判断するに当たって考慮される。 When assessment is made over whether or not Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment fall under Exclusionary Conduct, consideration is given to factors concerning conditions of the conduct, such as the prices of the products of an entrepreneur in the upstream market, the conditions and details of transactions with a trading customer, and the intention and purpose of the entrepreneur. 例えば，行為者が一部の供給先事業者に対して供給する川上市場における商品の価格が，供給の内容その他の条件の相違に基づく合理的な範囲を超えて他の供給先事業者に対する価格よりも高く設定されている場合は，当該一部の供給先事業者にとって仕入原価が高くなるため，その販売する川下市場における商品の価格をより高く設定せざるを得なくなる。この場合において，特に，当該一部の供給先事業者にとっての仕入原価が，他の供給先事業者が販売する川下市場における商品の販売価格（行為者自ら川下市場における商品を販売している場合は，当該商品の販売価格を含む。）を上回るようなときは，当該一部の供給先事業者は経済的合理性のある事業活動によって他の供給先事業者（又は行為者）に対抗することができないと考えられる。したがって，拒絶等を受けた供給先事業者の川下市場における事業活動を困難にさせると認められやすくなる。 For example, if the prices of products in the upstream market that an entrepreneur supplies to some trading customers are set at a higher level than those for other trading customers, going beyond reasonable degree, on the basis of differences in the details of supply and other conditions, those trading customers will have to increase the price of their products in the downstream market because the purchasing costs will be higher for them. In this case, particularly when the purchasing costs for those trading customers is higher than the selling price of the products sold by other trading customers in the downstream market or the selling price of the product sold by the alleged entrepreneur in the downstream market, if the entrepreneur itself sell it there, it is considered that those trading customers cannot compete with other trading customers (or the alleged entrepreneur) through economically reasonable business activities. Accordingly, such a case would be more likely to be deemed to cause difficulty in the business activities of the trading customers who are unable to easily find an alternative supplier in the upstream market. ア　Ｘ社ら１０社は，ぱちんこ機の製造に関する多くの特許権等を所有すると同時に，国内において販売されるぱちんこ機のほとんどを供給する製造販売業者である。Ｘ社ら１０社は，その所有する特許権等の管理をＹ連盟に委託するとともに，これらに係る発明等の実施許諾の意思決定に実質的に関与していた。Ｙ連盟が所有又は管理運営する特許権等は，ぱちんこ機の製造を行う上で重要な権利であり，これらに係る発明等の実施許諾を受けることなくぱちんこ機を製造することは困難な状況にあった。Ｘ社ら１０社及びＹ連盟は，ぱちんこ機の製造分野（川下市場）への参入を排除する旨の方針に基づき，Ｙ連盟が所有又は管理運営する特許権等の集積を図り，これらに係る発明等の実施許諾に係る市場（川上市場）において，既存のぱちんこ機製造業者以外の者に対しては実施許諾を拒絶するなどにより，参入を希望する事業者がぱちんこ機の製造を開始できないようにした。このようなＸ社ら１０社及びＹ連盟の行為は，ぱちんこ機を製造しようとする者の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された。（平成９年８月６日勧告審決，平成９年（勧）第５号） A. Ten companies including Company X owned numerous patent rights for the manufacture of pachinko machine (pachinko is a popular Japanese pinball game) and, at the same time, distributed almost all of the pachinko machines in Japan. The ten companies including Company X outsourced the management of their owned patent rights to Company Y and substantially participated in the decision making on granting a license of patented inventions for pachinko and pachislot. The patented inventions owned or managed by Company Y were important rights for the manufacture of pachinko machines. Under the circumstances, it was difficult to manufacture pachinko machines without being granted a license of the patented inventions. On the basis of a policy of preventing new entry into the pachinko machine manufacturing market (downstream market), the ten companies including Company X and Company Y attempted to accumulate patented inventions owned or managed by Company Y and made it impossible for persons who intended to enter the market to commence the manufacture of pachinko machines by refusing to grant a license of the patented inventions to anyone other than the existing pachinko manufacturers in the market, pertaining to licensing the patented inventions (upstream market). As a result, such conduct by the ten companies including Company X and Company Y was deemed to exclude the business activities of entrepreneurs who intended to manufacture pachinko machines (JFTC recommendation decision, August 6, 1997). イ　Ｘ社は，東日本地区を業務区域として地域電気通信事業を営む者であり，光ファイバ通信サービスの提供基盤となる加入者光ファイバの保有量においても，戸建て住宅向け光ファイバ通信サービスの開通件数においても，東日本地区のほぼ全域において極めて大きなシェアを占めていた。そのため，加入者光ファイバ設備を保有しない者にとって，戸建て住宅向け光ファイバ通信サービス市場（川下市場）においてサービスを提供するには，加入者光ファイバ設備接続市場（川上市場）においてＸ社の保有する加入者光ファイバ設備に接続することが極めて重要であった。このような状況において，Ｘ社は，自ら光ファイバ通信サービスを提供するに当たり，他の電気通信事業者がＸ社に支払う接続料金を下回るユーザー料金を設定した。このため，新規事業者は，ユーザーを獲得するためには，Ｘ社に接続料金を支払いながらＸ社のユーザー料金に対抗するユーザー料金を設定しなければならず，逆ざやが生じて大幅な赤字を負担せざるを得ないこととなり，戸建て住宅向け光ファイバ通信サービス事業に参入することは事実上著しく困難となった。このようなＸ社の行為は，Ｘ社の加入者光ファイバ設備に接続して戸建て住宅向け光ファイバ通信サービスを提供しようとする事業者の事業活動を排除するものであると認定された。（東京高判平成２１年５月２９日，平成１９年（行ケ）第１３号） B. Company X was engaged in the regional telecommunications business in eastern Japan and had an extremely large market share in almost all areas of eastern Japan in terms of the volume of holdings of subscriber optical fiber facilities, which was indispensable for providing optical fiber telecommunications services, and in terms of the number of optical fiber telecommunications to the home (FTTH services). Therefore, it was extremely important for those who had no subscriber optical fiber equipment to connect with the subscriber optical fiber equipment owned by Company X in the subscriber optical fiber equipment connection market (upstream market) to provide services in the FTTH service market (downstream market). Under the circumstances, Company X provided FTTH services at a price of the user fee, which was lower than the connection fee paid to Company X by other telecommunications carriers. Therefore, in order to win users, other telecommunications carriers had to set a user fee that could counter against the user fee of Company X while paying Company X the connection fee; further, the other telecommunications carriers would be forced to suffer a large deficit, because it would generate negative margins. It has virtually become extremely difficult for other telecommunications carriers to enter the FTTH service business. Such conduct by Company X was deemed to exclude the business activities of other telecommunications carriers who intended to connect the subscriber optical fiber equipment owned by Company X and provide FTTH services (Tokyo High Court Judgment May 29, 2009). 第３　一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限すること Part III Substantial Restraint of Competition in Any Particular Field of Trade １　一定の取引分野 1. A Particular Field of Trade 排除型私的独占に該当するか否かについては，前記第２の排除行為により一定の取引分野における競争に与える影響がどのようなものであるかという観点から判断される。 Whether or not the Exclusionary Conduct described in Part II above falls under Exclusionary Private Monopolization is assessed from the viewpoint of the influence that the alleged conduct has on the competition in a particular field of trade. この場合における一定の取引分野とは，排除行為によって競争の実質的制限がもたらされる範囲をいい，その成立する範囲は，具体的な行為や取引の対象・地域・態様等に応じて相対的に決定されるべきものである。したがって，一定の取引分野は，不当な取引制限と同様，具体的行為や取引の対象・地域・態様等に応じて，当該行為に係る取引及びそれにより影響を受ける範囲を検討し，その競争が実質的に制限される範囲を画定して決定されるのが原則である。 In this case, a particular field of trade means the scope where the Exclusionary Conduct causes a substantial restraint of competition. The scope is relatively decided depending on factors such as the objects, regions, and conditions of the conduct and trade. Accordingly, it is in principle, like the unreasonable restraint of trade, that the JFTC will assess the scope influenced by the related trade depending on factors such as the objects, regions, and conditions of the conduct and trade and determine the scope where competition is substantially restrained. また，排除型私的独占は，単独の事業者によって行われることが多く，加えて，排除行為は多種多様であり，排除行為として複数の行為がなされることもある。このため，排除型私的独占に係る一定の取引分野の画定については，排除行為に係る取引及びそれにより影響を受ける範囲を検討する際に，必要に応じて，需要者（又は供給者）にとって取引対象商品（注１９）と代替性のある商品の範囲（後記（２））又は地理的範囲（後記（３））がどの程度広いものであるかとの観点を考慮することになる。 Exclusionary Private Monopolization is often committed by a single entrepreneur. In addition, there are various types of Exclusionary Conduct. There are cases where multiple acts could be committed as Exclusionary Conduct. Therefore, to determine a particular field of trade pertaining to Exclusionary Private Monopolization, at the time of assessing the scope influenced by the trade pertaining to Exclusionary Conduct, the JFTC will consider the scope of products (in (2) below) that substitute for the traded products (Note 19) or the geographical scope (in (3) below) for users (or suppliers), as necessary. （注１９）排除行為が前記第２の４の「抱き合わせ」に該当する場合は従たる商品を指し，前記第２の５の「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」に該当する場合は川下市場における商品を指す。 (Note 19) The traded products refer to the tied products when the Exclusionary Conduct falls under "Tying" (in 4 of Part II above), and refer to the products in the downstream market when the Exclusionary Conduct falls under "Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment" (in 5 of Part II above). 商品の範囲は，主として需要者からみた商品の代替性という観点から画定される。需要者にとっての商品の代替性の程度は，当該商品の効用等の同種性の程度と一致することが多く，商品の範囲は当該商品の効用等の同種性の程度により判断できることが多い。 The scope of products is determined mainly from the viewpoint of the substitutability of products for users. The degree of the substitutability of products for users often corresponds to the degree of similarity of utility of the products, and the scope of products is often determined from the degree of similarity of utility of the products. また，商品の範囲が画定されるに当たり，需要者からみた代替性の程度のほかに，必要に応じて，供給者が多大な追加的費用やリスクを負うことなく，短期間のうちに，ある商品から他の商品に製造・販売を転換し得るか否かが考慮されることがある。 In addition, when the scope of products is determined, besides the degree of the substitutability of products for users, if necessary, the JFTC would consider whether suppliers are able to switch the manufacture and sale of one product to another within a short period of time without substantial added cost and risk. 商品の効用等の同種性の程度について評価を行うに当たっては，次のような事項が考慮される。 Assessing the degree of similarity of a product's utility for users, the JFTC will consider the following factors. ア　用途 A. Usage ある商品と取引対象商品が同一の用途に用いられているか否か，又は用いることができるか否かが考慮される。 Consideration is given to whether or not a product is, or has the potential to be, used in the same manner as the traded product. 同一の用途に用いることができるか否かを判断するに当たっては，商品の大きさ，形状等の外形的な特徴や，強度，可塑性，耐熱性，絶縁性等の物性上の特性，純度等の品質，規格，方式等の技術的な特徴等が総合的に考慮される（ただし，これらの特徴がある程度異なっていても，同一の用途に用いることができると認め得る場合がある。）。 To determine whether both, a product and the traded product, are used in the same manner, the following factors are considered: external features such as size and form; specific material characteristics such as strength, plasticity, heat resistance, and insulation; quality such as purity; and technological characteristics such as standards and systems. (However, even if these characteristics differ to a certain extent, both products might be considered to have the same usage.) なお，取引対象商品が複数の用途に用いられている場合には，それぞれの用途ごとに，商品が同一の用途に用いられているか否か，又は用いることができるか否かが考慮される。 Where the traded product is used in several ways, each usage is examined to determine whether any other products are, or have the potential to be, used in the same manner. イ　価格・数量の動き等 B. Changes in price, quantity, etc. 価格水準の違い，価格・数量の動き等が考慮される場合がある。 Differences in the level of prices or changes in price and quantity may be considered. 例えば，ある商品と取引対象商品との間で，価格水準が大きく異なることから，又は価格水準に差はないが取引対象商品の使用から切り替えるために設備の変更，従業員の訓練等の費用を要することから，取引対象商品の代わりとして当該商品が用いられることが少ないために，取引対象商品と当該商品とは効用等が同種であると認められない場合がある。 For example, there are cases where the traded product (Product X) is not deemed to have similar utility as that of another product (Product Y), because Product Y is rarely used as a substitute for Product X owing to a significant price difference between Products X and Y or costs that are involved in substituting Product Y for Product X to change the facilities or train employees despite no price difference between Products X and Y. また，例えば，取引対象商品である甲商品の価格が上昇した場合に，需要者が甲商品に代えて乙商品を購入する結果として，乙商品の販売数量が増加し，又は乙商品の価格が上昇するといった関係がある場合には，甲商品は乙商品と効用等が同種であると認められる。 In addition, it is deemed that Product X has similar utility as that of product Y, in such a case that the sales volume of Product Y increases or the price of Product Y rises as a result of users' purchasing Product Y as a substitute for Product X, if the price of Product X rises. ウ　需要者の認識・行動 C. Recognition and behavior of users 需要者の認識・行動が考慮される場合がある。 The recognition and behavior of users may be considered. 例えば，取引対象商品である甲商品と乙商品に物性上の特性等に違いがあっても，需要者が，商品丙を製造するための原料として甲商品と乙商品を併用しているため，甲商品と乙商品は効用等が同種であると認められる場合がある。 For example, there are cases where, even though the specific material characteristics of Product X (the traded product) and Product Y are different, Products X and Y are deemed to provide similar utility since there could be a case in which users use either of them as raw materials to produce Product Z. また，取引対象商品の価格が過去に引き上げられたときに，需要者が取引対象商品に代えて別の商品を用いたことがあるか否かが考慮されることがある。 In addition, there are instances where, when the price of the traded product was increased in the past, it could be taken into account whether users used another product as a substitute for the traded product. 地理的範囲についても，商品の範囲と同様に，主として各地域の需要者からみた商品の代替性の観点から判断される。商品の代替性については，需要者及び供給者の行動や商品の輸送に係る問題の有無等から判断できることが多い。 The geographical scope, the same as the scope of products, is determined mainly from the viewpoint of the substitutability of products for users in each area. The substitutability of products can often be determined depending on the behavior of users and suppliers and the presence of problems regarding the transportation of the product. 需要者及び供給者の行動や商品の輸送に係る問題の有無等について評価を行うに当たっては，次のような事項が考慮される。 The JFTC will consider the following factors to assess the behavior of users and suppliers and the presence of problems regarding the transportation of the product. ア　供給者の事業地域，需要者の買い回る範囲等 A. Business area of suppliers and area for the users to purchase 需要者が，通常，どの範囲の地域から商品を購入することができるかという点については，需要者の買い回る範囲（消費者の購買行動等）や，供給者の販売網等の事業地域及び供給能力等が考慮される。 With regard to the range of the region in which users can normally purchase the product, consideration is given to factors such as the area around which users purchase the product (such as the purchasing behavior of consumers), the business area such as the distribution network of suppliers, and their supply capacity. また，商品の価格が過去に引き上げられたときに，需要者がどの範囲の地域の供給者から当該商品を購入したかが考慮されることがある。 Consideration may be also given to the region in which the users purchased the product when the price of the product in a certain region was increased in the past. イ　商品の特性 B. Characteristics of products 鮮度を維持しやすいものであるか，破損しやすいものであるか，重量物であるか等の商品の特性は，商品について輸送可能な範囲や輸送の難易の程度に影響を与える。 Features of products, such as perishability, heaviness, and fragility, affect the scope of transportation or the degree of difficulty in transporting the products. ウ　輸送手段・費用等 C. Means and cost of transport 輸送手段，輸送に要する費用が価格に占める割合，輸送に要する費用が輸送される地域間における商品の価格差より大きいか否か等の事情は，需要者が，通常，どの範囲の地域から商品を購入することができるかにおいて考慮される。 Consideration is given to factors such as the modes of transportation, the ratio of the transportation cost to the price of products, and whether the transportation cost is larger than the regional price difference in order to assess the range of region in which users can normally purchase the product. ２　競争の実質的制限 2. Substantial Restraint of Competition 独占禁止法第２条第５項に規定する「一定の取引分野における競争を実質的に制限する」の意義については，裁判例上，競争自体が減少して，特定の事業者又は事業者集団がその意思で，ある程度自由に，価格，品質，数量，その他各般の条件を左右することによって，市場を支配することができる状態を形成・維持・強化することをいうものと解される旨判示されている（東京高判平成２１年５月２９日，平成１９年（行ケ）第１３号）。 With regard to the definition of "substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of trade," which is provided for in Article 2 (5) of the Antimonopoly Act, the appealed court held that this is interpreted to mean establishing, maintaining, or strengthening the state in which a certain entrepreneur or a certain group of entrepreneurs can control the market at will by being, to some extent, free to influence price, quality, quantity, and other various conditions after competition itself has lessened (Tokyo High Court Judgment May 29, 2009). このような趣旨における市場支配的状態が形成・維持・強化されていれば，現実に価格の引上げ等が行われていない場合であっても，競争を実質的に制限すると認められる。 If the state of market control by such means is established, maintained, or strengthened, it is deemed that competition is substantially restrained, even in the case where the prices are not increased in reality. 競争の実質的制限の存否は，一律に特定の基準によって判断されるのではなく，個別具体的な事件ごとに，次の事項を総合的に考慮して判断される（注２０）。 The JFTC will not rely on a certain specific criteria but comprehensively consider the following factors on a case-by-case basis to assess whether or not competition is substantially restrained (Note 20). ア　行為者の地位及び競争者の状況 A. Position of the alleged entrepreneur and the conditions of the competitors （ア）行為者の市場シェア及びその順位 (A) Market share (Note 21) and its ranking of the said entrepreneur 供給者たる行為者の市場シェア（注２１）が大きく，その順位が高い場合には，一般に，行為者が取引対象商品の価格を引き上げようとしたときに，競争者が行為者に代わって当該商品を十分供給することが容易ではない。したがって，行為者が市場シェアの大きい第一位の事業者である場合や，行為者の市場シェアと競争者の市場シェアとの格差が大きい場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者の取引対象商品の価格引上げに対する競争者の牽制力は弱くなると考えられることから，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Where the alleged supplier has a larger market share and its ranking is higher, it is less easy for its competitors to supply products sufficiently in place of the supplier when the supplier increases price of the traded products. Thus, in such a case that the supplier has the top ranking with a large market share or a case that the gap between the market shares of the supplier and its competitor is wide, it would be more likely to conclude that competition is substantially restrained since the ability of the competitors to constrain the supplier's price increase deems to be weaker. 特に，これらの状況が過去から継続し，将来においても容易に変化すると見込めない場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 In particular, if these circumstances have continued from the past and are not expected to easily change in the future, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition. （イ）市場における競争の状況 (B) Conditions of competition in the market 従来，排除された事業者との間で競争が活発に行われてきたことが，市場全体の価格引下げや品質・品揃えの向上等につながってきたと認められる場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Where the circumstances that robust competition has so far been made between the alleged entrepreneur and an excluded entrepreneur are deemed to cause price decrease or the improvement of product quality or variety in the entire market, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition. また，排除行為により，少数の有力な事業者に市場シェアが集中する場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，各事業者の利害が共通することが多いため，協調的な行動が取られやすくなることから，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Where a market share concentrates on a few leading entrepreneurs as a result of Exclusionary Conduct, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition, because they tend to take coordinated conduct as they would mostly come to share common interests. （ウ）競争者の状況 (C) Conditions of the competitors 価格・品質面で優れた商品を販売する競争者や原材料調達力，技術力，販売力，信用力，ブランド力，広告宣伝力等の総合的な事業能力が高い競争者が，市場において競争的な行動をとることが困難となる場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Where Exclusionary Conduct makes it difficult for competitors to sell products superior in price and quality or competitors with high business capability to take competitive actions in the market, such as abilities to procure raw materials, technical capabilities, marketing capabilities, creditworthiness, brand value, and advertising capabilities, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition. また，競争者の供給余力が十分でない場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者が取引対象商品の価格を引き上げることに対して牽制力が働かないことがある。したがって，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Where the excess supply capacities of competitors are not sufficient, the abilities of the competitors to constraint the said entrepreneurs' price increase may not work better than otherwise. Therefore, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition. イ　潜在的競争圧力 B. Potential competitive pressure 一般に，参入が容易ではなく，行為者が取引対象商品の価格を引き上げても一定の期間に他の事業者が新たに参入する可能性が低い場合は，行為者が価格等をある程度自由に左右することが可能となることから，そうでない場合と比較して，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Generally, where market entry is not easy, and it is less likely that a new competitor enters the market within a certain period in case that the alleged entrepreneur increases the price of the traded product, the said entrepreneur could be, to some extent, free to influence price and other conditions. Therefore, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition. 潜在的な競争圧力が十分働いているか否かについては，次の事項を総合的に考慮して，一定の期間に他の事業者が新たに参入する可能性が，行為者が価格等をある程度自由に左右することを妨げる要因となり得るか否かが判断される（注２２）。 With regard to whether or not potential competitive pressure works sufficiently, the JFTC will comprehensively consider the following factors to assess whether or not the possibility of entry by another competitor within a certain period can be a factor preventing the said entrepreneur from becoming, to some extent, free to influence price and other conditions of the traded products (Note 22). （ア）制度上の参入障壁の程度 (A) Degree of institutional entry barriers 法令等に基づく規制が参入の障壁となっている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者が取引対象商品の価格を引き上げたとしても参入が行われないこととなるため，潜在的な競争圧力は働きにくい。 Where regulations based on legislations serve as an entry barrier, potential competitive pressure is unlikely to work, because the entry will not be possible even if the said entrepreneur increases the price of the traded products. （イ）実態面での参入障壁の程度 (B) Degree of entry barriers in practice 参入のための必要資本量が大きく，立地条件，技術条件，原材料調達の条件，販売面の条件等について参入者が既存事業者に比べて不利な状況に置かれている場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，潜在的な競争圧力は働きにくい。 When the scale of capital necessary for entry is large, and an entrant is under less advantageous conditions than those for existing entrepreneurs in terms of location, technical issues, conditions of purchasing raw materials, or sales conditions, potential competitive pressure is unlikely to work. （ウ）参入者の商品と行為者の商品との代替性の程度 (C) Degree of substitutability between the entrant's and the entrepreneur's products 参入者の商品と行為者の商品との代替性が高い場合には，そうでない場合と比較して，需要者は躊躇なく参入者の商品を購入・使用することができると考えられるため，潜在的な競争圧力は働きやすい。 Where substitutability between the entrant's product and the entrepreneur's product is high because it is not considered that users can purchase and use the entrant's product without hesitation, potential competitive pressure is likely to work. 他方，参入者が行為者と同等の品質の商品を同等の品揃えで製造・販売することが困難であるような場合や，需要者の使い慣れの問題から参入者の商品が選好されないような場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，潜在的な競争圧力は働きにくい。 Meanwhile, where it is difficult for the entrant to produce and distribute product with a quality and variety equivalent to those of the entrepreneur's product, or where users do not purchase the entrant's product, potential competitive pressure would be unlikely to work because they are familiar with the product that is usually used. ウ　需要者の対抗的な交渉力 C. Users' countervailing bargaining power 需要者が取引先を変更することが困難であるなどの事情により，行為者に対して対抗的な交渉力を有していない場合には，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者が価格等をある程度自由に左右することが可能となることから，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されやすい。 Where users do not have the countervailing bargaining power against the alleged entrepreneur for such circumstances that it is difficult for users to switch the suppliers, it would be more likely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition, because the said entrepreneur becomes, to some extent, free to influence price and other conditions. 他方，需要者が供給先を切り替えることが容易である場合や切替えの可能性を供給者に示すことによって需要者の価格交渉力が生じている場合のように，需要者の調達方法，供給先の分散の状況，変更の難易の程度等からみて需要者の価格交渉力が強い場合は，そうでない場合と比較して，行為者が価格等をある程度自由に左右することをある程度妨げる要因となる。したがって，競争を実質的に制限していると判断されにくい。 Meanwhile, where users' price bargaining powers are strong in terms of the means of their procuring the product, the dispersion of suppliers, and ease of switching, such circumstances where users easily switch the suppliers or where users acquire price bargaining powers by indicating the possibility of switching the suppliers, this power becomes the factor to interfere the entrepreneur from becoming, to some extent, free to influence price and other conditions. Thus, it would more unlikely to be deemed to cause a substantial restraint of competition. エ　効率性 D. Efficiency 行為者の排除行為に付随して，規模の経済，生産設備の統合，工場の専門化，輸送費用の削減，研究開発体制の効率化等により，生産性の向上，技術革新，事業活動の効率性の向上がもたらされ，行為者が競争的な行動をとることが見込まれる場合には，競争の実質的制限の判断に際してこのような事情が考慮されることがある。 Where the alleged entrepreneur is expected to take competitive actions owing to the improvement of productivity, technological innovation, and the improvement of the efficiency of business activities-which are caused by the economics of scale, integration of production facilities, specialization of facilities, reduction of transportation costs, and improvement of the efficiency of research and development systems that are incidental to Exclusionary Conduct of the said entrepreneur, such circumstances may be taken into account to assess whether or not competition is substantially restrained. この場合において，効率性の向上が考慮されるのは，①行為に固有の効果として効率性が向上し，それがより競争制限的でない他の方法によっては生じ得ないものであることが認められ，かつ，②当該効率性の向上により，商品の価格の低下，品質の向上，新商品の提供等の成果が需要者に還元され，需要者の厚生が増大するものであることが認められるときである。 In such a case, the efficiency improvements will be taken into account when (i) it is deemed that efficiency improves as effects specific to the conduct, and it cannot be achieved by other means that are less restrictive on competition and (ii) it is deemed that outcomes such as a decline in the prices of products, an improvement of product's quality, and a supply of new products are returned to users due to the said improvement of efficiency, and the welfare of users is improved. 例えば，抱き合わせについて，従たる商品に規模の経済が認められる場合であって，主たる商品と抱き合わせて販売する以外の方法では従たる商品の需要を高めることができない場合が考えられる。このような場合において，実際に従たる商品の供給量が増大し，それに伴って需要者に安い価格で提供され，市場における競争が促進されることにより需要者厚生が増大していると認められるときは，このような事情を考慮した上で，競争を実質的に制限するか否かが判断される。 For example, a situation is conceivable where, in the case of Tying, the economics of scale works in the tied products, and the demand for the tied products cannot be increased by means other than selling the tied products together with the tying products. In this situation, where the supply of the tied products deems to be increased, resulting in supplying the products to users at the lower price, and improving users' welfare according to promoting competition in the market, the JFTC will consider such circumstances to assess whether or not competition is substantially restrained. ただし，排除行為が独占又は独占に近い状態をもたらす場合には，通常，競争を実質的に制限すると判断される。 However, where Exclusionary Conduct causes monopoly or monopolistic situation, it would be normally concluded that competition is substantially restrained. オ　消費者利益の確保に関する特段の事情 E. Extraordinary circumstances to assure consumer interests 問題となる行為が，安全，健康，その他の正当な理由に基づき，一般消費者の利益を確保するとともに，国民経済の民主的で健全な発達を促進するものである場合には，例外的に，競争の実質的制限の判断に際してこのような事情が考慮されることがある。すなわち，独占禁止法第１条に記載された，公正かつ自由な競争を促進し，もって，一般消費者の利益を確保するとともに，国民経済の民主的で健全な発達を促進するという目的から首肯され得るような特段の事情がある場合には，当該行為が「競争を実質的に制限すること」という要件に該当しないこともあり得る（注２３）。 Where Exclusionary Conduct with justifiable reasons such as safety and health assures the interests of general consumers and promotes the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy, such circumstances may be exceptionally taken into account to assess whether or not competition is substantially restrained. Namely, if there are extraordinary circumstances that can be supported in view of the purpose of promoting fair and free trade to support the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as to assure the interests of general consumer, as provided in Article 1 of the Antimonopoly Act, the said conduct may not fulfill the requirement of "substantial restraint of competition" (Note 23). 例えば，ある地域においてシェア約５０パーセントのガス機器販売業者が，一酸化炭素中毒による重大事故を防止する観点から，不完全燃焼防止装置付きのガス機器への買替え需要を喚起するために，不完全燃焼防止装置が装備されていないガス機器を使用する者に対し，供給に要する費用を下回る価格で自社の不完全燃焼防止装置付きのガス機器を販売するような場合には，その行為は重大事故を未然に防止するという目的に基づくものであって，一般消費者の利益につながるとともに，それが競争に与える影響は限定的であることが多いと考えられることから，このような事情を勘案した上で，競争を実質的に制限するか否かが判断される。 For example, in such a case that a gas equipment sales company with approximately 50% market share in a region sells its gas equipment with an imperfect combustion prevention device to someone who uses gas equipment without the device at a price lower than the cost required for its supply in order to stimulate replacement demands for gas equipment with the devices from a viewpoint of the prevention of serious accidents caused by carbon monoxide poisoning, it is considered that the conduct is based on the purpose of preventing serious accidents before happens; further, it is considered that it serves the interests of general consumers and that its influence on competition would be more likely to be limited. Therefore, the JFTC will consider such circumstances to assess whether or not competition is substantially restrained. ただし，排除行為が独占又は独占に近い状態をもたらす場合には，通常，競争を実質的に制限すると判断される。 However, where Exclusionary Conduct causes monopoly or monopolistic situation, it would be normally concluded that competition is substantially restrained. （注２０）排除行為が前記第２の５の「供給拒絶・差別的取扱い」に該当する場合における競争の実質的制限の存否については，川下市場における市場支配的状態が形成・維持・強化されているか否かによって判断されるため，川下市場における供給先事業者とその競争者を中心にそれぞれの事項が判断される。 (Note 20) When the Exclusionary Conduct falls under "Refusal to Supply and Discriminatory Treatment" (in 5 of Part II above), the existence or nonexistence of a substantial restraint of competition will be assessed based on whether or not the state of market control are established, maintained, or strengthened in the downstream market. Therefore, each factor will be assessed mainly in terms of the trading customers and their competitors in the downstream market. （注２１）市場シェアは，一定の取引分野における商品の取引数量に占める各事業者の商品の取引数量の百分比による。ただし，当該商品にかなりの価格差がみられ，価額で供給実績等を算定するという慣行が定着していると認められる場合など，数量によることが適当でない場合には，取引額により市場シェアを算出する。また，複数の事業者が結合又は通謀して行為者となる場合の市場シェアは，各行為者の市場シェアを合算した値による。 (Note 21) "Market shares" are based on the percentage of the quantity of the products of each entrepreneur to the quantity of traded products in any particular field of trade. However, in the case where the use of the quantity of the products in calculation of the market share is not appropriate, such as the case where it is deemed that there is a large difference in the price of the products and the practice that the price of the products is used to calculate the outcomes of supply takes root, market shares will be calculated based on turnover. If multiple entrepreneurs combined or conspired with each other, the market share herein refers to the sum of the market shares of products supplied by the respective entrepreneurs involved. （注２２）前記第２の２の「商品を供給しなければ発生しない費用を下回る対価設定」による排除行為については，行為者が取引対象商品の価格を引き上げたとしても，法令等に基づく規制や立地，技術，原材料調達等の諸条件による参入障壁が低いため有効な牽制力のある事業者が短期間のうちに参入することが現実的に見込める場合がある。このような場合には，当該行為が競争を実質的に制限するものであると判断されることはない。 (Note 22) With regard to Exclusionary Conduct by "Below-cost Pricing" (in 2 of Part II above), there is a case where even if the alleged entrepreneur increases price of the traded products, the entry of a competitor who has the ability to constrain against it could be realistically expected within a short period of time, because there are almost no entry barriers due to regulations based on legislations, or conditions such as locations, technical issues, and conditions of purchasing raw materials. In such a case, it would not be concluded that competition is substantially restrained. （注２３）独占禁止法第１条の目的規定の位置付けに関しては，判例上，同法第２条第６項にいう「公共の利益に反して」の解釈において，原則としては同法の直接の保護法益である自由競争経済秩序に反することを指すが，現に行われた行為が形式的にこれに該当する場合であっても，この法益と当該行為によって守られる利益とを比較衡量して，「一般消費者の利益を確保するとともに，国民経済の民主的で健全な発達を促進する」という同法の究極の目的に実質的に反しないと認められる例外的な場合を，この規定にいう「不当な取引制限」行為から除外する趣旨と解すべき旨判示されている（最判昭和５９年２月２４日，昭和５５年（あ）第２１５３号）。 (Note 23) With respect to the position of the purpose provision stipulated in Article 1 of the Antimonopoly Act, the Supreme Court provided the interpretation of "contrary to the public interest" stipulated in Article 2 (6) of the Antimonopoly Act as follows: In principle, "contrary to the public interest" refers to infringement of free competitive economic order, which is the interest directly provided by the Antimonopoly Act. Nevertheless, there could be an exceptional situation where it is deemed that, even though a certain entrepreneur's conduct might be superficially contrary to the free competitive economic order, they could not substantially infringe ultimate purpose of the Act as "to promote the democratic and wholesome development of the national economy as well as to assure the interest of general consumers," after the interest protected by the said conduct were weighed against the interest protected by the Act. It should be interpreted that the provision, "contrary to the public interest," means to exclude this exceptional situation from the conduct of "unreasonable restraint of trade" stipulated in Article 2 (6) (Supreme Court judgment, February 24, 1984).